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One issue which has long been a problem and a thorn in the
side of labor and the public' and which will continue to be a
problem, at least in the foreseeable future, is that of the work-
assignment dispute. In essence, a work-assignment dispute in-
volves competition between two or more groups as to who shall
perform a certain work task. To resolve the dispute it is necessary
to allocate a specific task to one group of employees rather than
to another. It is axiomatic that the structure of any organization
among these employees will affect the disposition of the dis-
pute. This type of dispute usually arises where several unions,
or groups of employees, are working at a common job situs
or are engaged in an integrated product assembly. The core of
the problem arises from the existence of craft unions-the juris-
diction of each being limited to workers engaged in performing
specified tasks. As the foundation of the current labor movement
is in the medieval guilds, it is easy to understand why it is organ-
ized only to handle a specified type of work. In the past, as long
as these jurisdictions were kept separate there was no problem.
The problem began when the unions started working together.
In a progressive technological society the jurisdictional limits
laid down in the past became inadequate. Today, most unions'
jurisdictional claims are either ambiguous or overlapping with
the jurisdictional claims of other unions. This arises from the
impossibility of describing these tasks in exhaustive detail and
covering the inevitable modifications in the manner of doing
work as time passes. Out of this confusion there are bound to
arise conflicts over which union is to perform which work task
and a realization among the workers themselves that the con-
traction of the area in which their skills are to be used will
curtail their work opportunities. In this economic conflict the
competing work groups use strikes, picketing, or other forms of
work stoppage to force the employer to side with their particular
point of view. The frequently dramatic character of these con-
* L.L.B., Harvard; L.L.M., Georgetown University; Attorney with National
Labor Relations Board.
1. The first known instance of a work-assignment dispute occurred in London
in 1395.
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flicts and the apparent lack of any social gain to compensate
for their all too apparent losses have given them a notorious posi-
tion among industrial disputes.
The number of jurisdictional disputes that will occur during a
given year will depend upon the economic climate. In pros-
perous times jurisdictional disputes will be few since there will
be adequate work to be distributed. Conversely, during a reces-
sion or depression, the number of jurisdictional disputes will
increase as to who will perform the scarcity of jobs that remain.
Until periods of prolonged and widespread unemployment be-
come less frequent than they have been in the past, it may be
anticipated that this class of jurisdictional dispute will remain
a difficult problem.
These quarrels have been exacerbated by automation. Tech-
nological progress often makes meaningless the jurisdictional
boundaries among unions and eliminates jobs under the old clas-
sifications. Such technological changes can come about through
the introduction of new methods, materials, or machinery. As
each change is introduced the need for a particular skill is
reduced.
The work-assignment conflict, therefore, is the child of eco-
nomic fluctuation and change. As a result of such economic con-
flicts, profits and wages are lost; our economic position in rela-
tion to other countries falls behind; and our defense system is
endangered. While the basic remedy is to increase our economic
growth, other remedies which provide for a peaceful adjustment
of these disputes will eliminate the economic jungle that we
are now in.
The National Labor Relations Board is given jurisdiction to
settle such conflicts. This jurisdiction is conferred in a somewhat
oblique and complex manner. The sections of the Wagner Act
which control the jurisdictional dispute are Section 8(b) (4) (D)
and Section 10(k). Section 8(b) (4) (D) prohibits a union from
striking, picketing, or threatening an employer where an object
thereof is:
Forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work
to employees in a particular labor organization or in a par-
ticular trade, craft or class, rather than to employees in
another labor organization unless such employer is failing
to conform to an order or certification of the Board deter-
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It is only in determining such a charge that the Board may
decide that a dispute comes within Section 10(k). Section 10(k)
provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph 4 (D)
of Section 8(b), the Board is empowered and directed to
hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair
labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within 10 days after
notice that such charge has been filed, the parties of such
dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they
have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary
adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties
to the dispute, the decision of the Board or upon such volun-
tary adjustment of the dispute such charge shall be dis-
missed.
It should be noted that the 10(k) machinery does not become
available until the dispute breaks into open conflict.
At the time the Wagner Act was passed, the jurisdictional
dispute was not much of a problem since most of the country
was unorganized and those unions which had organized plants
were relatively weak. During this time the unions were more
concerned with getting into the plant than with fighting one
another over the right to perform a particular task. After the
passage of the Wagner Act and during the World War II years,
there was no problem since there was more than enough work
to go around. When World War II ended, our war time produc-
tion ended, thus forcing the returning veterans, production de-
fense workers, and consumer goods workers to compete for exist-
ing jobs. Because of this shrinkage, the period from 1945 to 194'7
was one in which the jurisdictional dispute attained its maturity.
So critical was the problem that President Truman in his State
of the Union message to the First Session of the 80th Congress2
called for:
Peaceful and binding determination of the issues (in dis-
pute) involving the question of which union is entitled to
perform a particular task.
Following this message various bills were introduced in the
House and Senate to curb jurisdictional strikes. The purpose of
all these bills was to protect the employer against being caught in
2. 93 CoNG. Rmc. 136 (1947).
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the middle of a union dispute with another union over who should
perform a particular work task. Congress achieved this result in
Section 8(b) (4) (D) which made it an unfair labor practice for a
union to strike or picket in an attempt to force an employer to
assign work to one group of employees rather than to another.
Still, Congress, realizing that Section 8(b) (4) (D) would not
solve the underlying problems of which union was entitled to
the work, provided Section 10(k) whereby the Board must de-
termine the dispute unless the parties have done so themselves.
In this way the parties can adjust their own dispute, and, if
they do so prior to the Board's formal determination under
Section 10(k), the Board will quash the notice of hearing. But
where there is no private adjustment machinery, where the pri-
vate adjustment machinery has broken down, or where the parties
have refused to abide by such an award, the Board must deter-
mine the underlying dispute by issuing a Section 10(k) deter-
rnination. Since a 10(k) determination is not a final order,s it
is not enforceable as such by a court 4 nor is it subject to review.5
If the parties do not comply with the Board's determination
under Section 10(k), then an 8(b) (4) (D) charge will issue. The
Board's ruling in the unfair labor practice proceeding will then
be enforceable by a court of appeals.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Radio
Broadcast Engineers," the Board's policy was that it would not
make affirmative work-assignment determinations and that it
would confine itself to the sole issue of whether the employer's
assignment of work violated any Board certification or order
or any contract between the employer and the union. If it did
not, the Board would hold that the union protesting the em-
ployer's assignment was not lawfully entitled to strike or picket
or to force the assignment of the disputed work to its members.
Under no circumstances would the Board disturb the employer's
assignment. Consequently, the employer's assignment was con-
trolling in the absence of any Board order or contract.
In a recent speech, Board member John H. Fanning explained
the early position.7 He stated:
3. See Manhattan Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F2d 320 (10th Cir. 1952).
4. See Moore Drydock Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 110 (1949).
5. Manhattan Constr. Co. v. NLRB, mipra note 3.
6. 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
7. NLRA-A View from the Construction Site (a speech given before the
Contractors' Association of Eastern Pennsylvania, January 24, 1963).
[Vol. 16
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From the outset these unique provisions of the Statute were
of great concern to the Board. In the first place what seemed
to be required of the Board was that it assume the role of an
arbitrator between several unions and employers involved in
a jurisdictional dispute. Arbitration, however, is neither an
administrative or judicial role in labor management rela-
tions. In effect, it is the means whereby unions and em-
ployers attempt to compromise their difference by selecting
an impartial outsider to tell them the fair and equitable
answer to a specific problem under all circumstances, includ-
ing their own contractual commitments, if any. It is a highly
specialized area of practice, an area not within the historic
expertise of the Board. Moreover, Congress had failed to
furnish the Board with any standards by which it could
reasonably determine the dispute. Standards, however, could
be supplied by the Board and the courts; expertise could be
acquired. A problem of greater concern to the Board was
the possible conflict with other provisions of the Act which
forbade a union to cause, or an employer to commit, discrim-
ination against any employee, to encourage or discourage
union membership. These latter sections, the Board has
always held, are of the very heart and core of the Statute.
If the Board were to award a disputed work assignment to
members of one union rather than to members of another,
would not the Board itself be a party to an unlawful dis-
crimination against the union members discharged from
their employment? These considerations led the Board to
tread warily and reluctantly in this area of the law. The
settlement of such disputes by voluntarily adjusting a
method suggested in the Act was encouraged wherever
possible.
Thus, the Board feared (1) that an affirmative award would
violate Section 8(a) (3) by encouraging membership in the win-
ning union; (2) that it lacked the standards with which to deter-
mine the dispute; (3) that it had no historic expertise in these
matters; and (4) that the parties could settle the dispute them-
selves through private adjustment machinery.
However, the Supreme Court, in Radio Broadcast Engineers
(CBS), rejected the Board's contentions and held that in a juris-
dictional dispute the NLRB is required by Section 10(k) to
make an affirmative assignment of disputed work among com-
peting groups of employees as a condition precedent to the is-
5
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suance of the complaint on Section 8(b) (4) (D). In reaching its
conclusions the Supreme Court made the following comment:
The language of Section 10(k), supplementing 8(b) (4) (D)
as it does, sets up a method adopted by Congress to try to
get jurisdictional disputes settled. The words "hear and
determine the dispute" convey, not only the idea of hearing,
but also the idea of deciding a controversy. And the clause
"the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall
have arisen" can have no other meaning except a jurisdic-
tional dispute under Section 8(b) (4) (D) which is a dispute
between two or more groups of employees over which is
entitled to do certain work for an employer. To determine
or settle the dispute as between them would normally require
a decision that one or the other is entitled to do the work in
dispute. Any decision short of that would obviously not be
conducive to quieting a quarrel between two groups which,
here as in most instances, is of so little interest to the em-
ployer that he seems perfectly willing to assign work to
either if the other will just let him alone.
It is true that this forces the Board to exercise under Sec-
tion 10(k) powers which are broad and lacking in rigid
standards to govern their application. But administrative
agencies are frequently given rather loosely defined powers
to cope with problems as difficult as those posed by jurisdic-
tional disputes and strikes. It might have been better, as
some persuasively argue in Congress, to entrust this matter
to arbitrators. Congress, after discussion and consideration,
decided to entrust this decision to the Board. It has had long
experience in hearing and disposing of similar labor prob-
lems. With this experience and a knowledge of the standards
generally used by arbitrators, unions, employers, joint
boards, and others in wrestling with this problem, we are
confident that the Board need not disclaim the power given
it for lack of standards. Experience and common sense will
supply the grounds for the performance of this job which
Congress has assigned the Board.
The Board's next contention is that the respondent's inter-
pretation of Section 10(k) should be rejected because it is
inconsistent with other provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The first such inconsistency urged is that of Section 8(a)
(3) and 8(b) (2) of the Act on the ground that the deter-
[ Vol. 16
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mination of jurisdictional disputes on their merits by the
Board might somehow enable the unions to compel employers
to discriminate in regard to employment in order to encour-
age union membership. The argument here which is based
upon the fact that 10(k) like 8(b) (4) (D) extends to juris-
dictional disputes between unions and unorganized groups
as well as disputes between two or more unions appears to
be that groups represented by unions, which almost always
prevail over nonunion groups in such a determination be-
cause their claim to the work would probably have more
basis in custom and tradition than the unorganized groups.
No such danger is present here, however, for both groups of
employees are represented by unions. Moreover, we feel
entirely confident that the Board with its many years of
experience in guarding against and redressing violations of
Section 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) will devise means of discharg-
ing its duties under 10(k) in a manner entirely harmonious
with those sections.
A second inconsistency is urged with 303(a) (4) of the
Act which authorizes suits for damages suffered because of
jurisdictional strikes. The argument here is that Section
303(a) (4) does not permit a union to establish as a defense
to an action for damages under that section that it is entitled
to such work struck on the basis of such similar factors as
practice or custom. A similar result is required here in order
to preserve substantive symmetry because [of] Section 303
(a) (4) on the one hand and Sections 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k)
on the other. This argument ignores the fact that this court
has recognized the separate and distinct nature of these two
approaches to the problem of handling jurisdictional strikes.
Since we do not require a substantive symmetry between
the two, we need not and do not decide what 6ffect a decision
of the Board under 10(k) might have on action under Sec-
tion 303(a) (4).
We conclude, therefore, that the Board's interpretation of
its duty under Section 10(k) is wrong and that under that
section it is the Board's responsibility and duty to decide
which of two or more employee groups claiming the right
to perform certain work tasks is right and specifically to
award such tasks in accordance with its decision.
8
8. NLRB v. Radio Broadcast Engineers, supra note 6, at 582.
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The Supreme Court also took note of a Board regulation which
is no longer in effect:
The rules and regulations adopted in 1947 by the Board pro-
vided that in a 10(k) proceeding the Board was to certify
the labor organization or the particular craft, trade or class
of employees, as the case may be, which shall perform the
particular work task in issue. This rule remained in effect
until 1958. 9
It should be noted that despite this command from the Su-
preme Court the Board, in at least one instance, has refused to
resolve a work assignment dispute. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Oompany1" the employer assigned the task of moving crated
glass to a group of inside glaziers represented by a laborers'
local. A glaziers' local protested on behalf of its outside glaziers.
This glazier local also represented inside glaziers who also sought
the work. The Board found that the dispute was one between
outside glaziers without specifying whether the work should go
to the laborers or the inside glaziers represented by the glaziers'
local. The dissent objected to this award on the ground that the
majority had not resolved the dispute, but had merely removed
one of three disputants and left it to the employer to decide
which of the remaining two was entitled to the work in question.
Because the Supreme Court did not adequately discuss the
Board's argument that an affirmative determination would be an
8(a) (3) or an 8(b) (2) violation, the problem still remains. The
problem is essentially this: Where two groups seek a particular
work assignment and the Board gives that assignment to one
group, those in the losing group in order to perform the work
must become part of the winning group. Thus, it is argued by
those who oppose affirmative awards that what we have in effect
is an illegal union shop combined with an illegal union hiring
hall in that members of the losing group who are now performing
the work task will not be allowed to do so in the future because
they are not members of the winning group. Furthermore, only
members of the winning group will be hired to perform this job
in the future. Although an affirmative award by the Board falls
within the literal interpretation of Section 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2),
it does not fall within the intent of these sections. Nevertheless,
even if we assume that an affirmative award would fall within
9. NLRB v. Radio Broadcast Engineers, supra note 6, at 585.
10. 137 N.L.R.B. 968 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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these sections, these problems are not insoluble. One way to avoid
the problem is to make an award in favor of a particular group
of employees without regard to whether or not it is represented
by a union. This the Board has done." Since the award is made
without regard to whether or not there is a union involved, the
award itself cannot be discriminatory. If the award is given to
a group that is currently represented by a union, the current
Board policy of outlawing closed shops and illegal hiring halls
should be sufficient protection to those employees who do not
belong to a union, or who belong to another union. When mem-
bers of the losing union are performing the job, then these
employees should be given an opportunity to become part of the
winning union's work force. Yet, if this is not possible, the fact
that they lose their jobs is not discriminatory.
12
An illegal jurisdictional strike or illegal picketing may expose
a union to a damage suit under Section 303(a):
It shall be unlawful for the purposes of this Section only in
an industry or activity affecting commerce for any organi-
zation to engage in or to induce or to encourage the em-
ployees of any employer to engage in a strike or concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufac-
ture, process, transport or otherwise handle or work any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services where an object thereof is (for) forcing or requiring
any employer to assign particular work to any employees in
any particular labor organization or any particular trade,
craft or class rather than to employees in another labor
organization or in another trade, craft or class unless such
employer is failing to conform to an order or certification
of the NLRB determining the bargaining representative
for employees performing such work.
and 303 (b) :
. . . whoever shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefore
in any district court of the United States subject to the limi-
tations and provisions of Section 301 hereof without respect
to the amount in controversy or any other court having juris-
11. For an example, see Jones Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962), where
the Board assigned the "disputed work to electricians who are represented by
the IBEW, but not to the IBEW, or to its members."
12. A similar situation exists where returning strikers take away the jobs
from their replacements who had performed the work during the strike.
9
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diction of the parties and shall recover the damages by him
sustained in the cost of the suit.
In Longshoremen v. Juneau SpruCe' 3 the Supreme Court con-
strued Section 8(b) (4) (D) and 303 (a) (4) to provide remedies
that are independent of each other. The Court indicated that a
Section 10(k) determination is a prerequisite to an administra-
tive order, but not to the granting of a legal remedy. Further-
more, the conduct that creates liability is the strike itself, not
the continued strike in defiance of the Board's determination.
The Supreme Court said in Radio Broadcast Engineers Union4
that a substantial symmetry between the two remedies is not
required, but it expressed no opinion on the relationship between
Board determinations under Section 10(k) and an employer's
action for damages under Section 303(a). The fact that the
Board and the courts can make inconsistent decisions under
various sections of the Act does not make one forum right and
another wrong as explained in the NLRB v. Deena Artware
case' r where the court of appeals stated:
We recognize that this finding is contrary to the finding
in the companion case in which the trial examiner found
that the picketing of the area of construction which caused
a cessation of work by the general contractors was on the
part of the Teamsters Union and not by the appellants,
which finding we have upheld and on which we have based
a ruling in that case. Under our existing system of courts,
juries, administrative agencies and appellate review such
findings, even though inconsistent, are not invalid and one
does not destroy the other. The two proceedings, even though
arising out of the same labor dispute, were heard by separate
fact finding agencies. The witnesses in the two proceedings
were not the same. The cross-examination of some witnesses
who testified in both proceedings was not by the same at-
torneys; necessarily the evidence produced in different pro-
ceedings by such testimony was not identical. Each fact find-
ing agency was entitled to make its own decision upon the
evidence before it. Though this court on review recognizes
the inconsistency, it may not be in accord with one of the
13. 342 U.S. 237 (1952).
14. NLRB v. Radio Broadcast Engineers, 364 U.S. 375, 385 (1961).
15. 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953) ; United
Brick and Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1952), cert.
dentied 344 U.S. 897 (1952).
[Vol. 16
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two rulings if it was making the rulings as a matter of
original jurisdiction, it does not have the right to set aside
such ruling, if in the case of the jury verdict it is supported
by substantial evidence, or in the case of the labor board
proceeding, it is supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole. In our opinion the respective
findings are so supported in each of the two proceedings.
Therefore, while it is possible to have inconsistent reme-
dies, both the Board and the courts ought to work together so
that uniformity and predictability will be achieved. Section
303 (a) should be read by the courts to incorporate Section
10(k). Under such an interpretation a Section 10(k) af-
firmative award which would be a defense in an 8(b) (4) (D)
situation should also be a defense in a 303 action. The court
should refuse to proceed with its litigation under Section
303 (b) until the Board has made its determination. Other-
wise, the possibility of a large assessment under 303(b)
might be sufficient to deter a union from striking a favor-
able Board or determination.16
Thus, while the Board may assign the work to a striking union,
the employer's right to sue that union for damages would still
exist under Section 303.
THE APPLICATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
DISPUTE SECTIONS
Since Section 10(k) states that "whenever it is charged that
any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the
meaning of paragraph 4(D) of Section 8(b) the Board is em-
powered and directed to hear and determine the dispute," the
provisions of 10(k) become applicable by the filing of a charge
alleging a violation of 8(b) (4) (D), and not by an actual find-
ing of the Board that 8b) (4) (D) in fact has been violated.
The issue of whether or not 8 (b) (4) (D) has been violated will
be treated later by the Board in a complaint proceeding. If the
Board believes that no jurisdictional dispute exists within the
meaning of Section 10(k) and 8(b) (4) (D), it will quash the
notice of hearing under Section (k). The reason is that the Board
is not required to hold a 10(k) hearing on every charge filed, but
only on those which appear to have merit after a reasonable
16. NLRB v. Deena Artware, 198 F2d 645, 649 (6th Cir. 1952).
11
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investigation. Under this policy the Board has set three limita-
tions as to what constitutes a jurisdictional dispute.
The first limitation was laid down in the Carling Brewing Co.
case 17 where the Board held "before making a determination of
the dispute in Section 10(k) proceedings, the Board is required
to find that there is a reasonable cause to believe that Section
8(b) (4) (D) has been violated."' 8 What is meant by "reasonable
cause to believe" is explained more fully by the Board in the
E. 0. Ernt case19 where the Board stated:
In order to make a positive determination of the dispute
in 10(k) proceedings we are now required to find that in
fact the unfair labor practice alleged in the charge has been
committed. We must, however, as a condition precedent to
passing upon the merits of the jurisdictional dispute be satis-
fied that there is reasonable cause to believe that unfair
labor practices have occurred. To satisfy this requirement it
is not enough to show that two competing groups of em-
ployees make claim to the same work assignment or that
there has been a concerted work stoppage by the employees
themselves. Even the common existence of these two sub-
sidiary facts, whatver suspicion they may create, necessarily
falls short of any proof that a union or its agents acted
illegally. Under the language of Section 8(b) (4) (D) the
evidence must relate to conduct or speech of the respondent
or its representatives.
20
It would appear from both the Carling and Ernst cases that all
the evidence relating to the 8(b) (4) (D) charge must be intro-
duced in the 10(k) proceeding. In the Ernst case above, the
Board stated after viewing the evidence:
We deem the total evidence in this case too vague and insub-
stantial to support the necessary finding that there is reason-
able cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has oc-
curred. There is no collateral evidence of any other conver-
sations among the principal persons involved that serve to
eliminate the ambiguous words that were exchanged.21
17. 136 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1962); see also, Automatic Sealing Service, 146
N.L.R.B. No. 49 (1964).
18. In this case the Board found that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port the conclusion that there was reasonable cause to believe that either of the
unions involved resorted to prohibited methods in pressing their claim for work
assignment.
19. 137 N.L.R.B. 1746 (1962).
20. E. C. Ernst, 137 N.L.R.B. 1746, 1751 (1962).
21. E. C. Ernst, supra note 20, at 1752.
[Vol. 16
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In B. P. John Furniture Corporation,22 the Board found the
evidence presented too vague and insubstantial to support a find-
ing that there was reasonable cause to believe that the union had
engaged in an unfair labor practice. The Board based this find-
ing on the ground that statements involved in the case were sub-
ject to interpretations other than as a threat to engage in illegal
conduct. In dissenting, Member Leedom made the following com-
ment:
My colleagues have concluded in effect that these statements
are ambiguous; that in view of conflicting evidence, it is
more reasonable to assume that these statements were not
made; and that in any event the inferences to be drawn from
these statements could just as well be lawful as unlawful.
Even assuming everything they say is true, it is wholly
irrelevant at this stage of the proceeding. Their analysis
would be relevant if the issue were whether a violation had
been established by a preponderance of the evidence. But
that is not the issue now. The issue now is only whether
there is enough evidence to establish a prima facie case of a
violation.2 3
From this we can conclude that the parties would be wise to
make a full showing of all the evidence that they would intro-
duce in relation to the 8(b) (4) (D) charge. In the Western
Electric Co. case,2 4 the Board indicated that the only difference
between Section 8(b) (4) (D) and a 10(k) proceeding in regard
to the underlying unfair labor practice charge was that the
Board would not conclusively resolve conflicts in testimony in
the 10(k) proceeding.
Inasmuch as Section 10(k) provides for a hearing wherever
it is charged, and not wherever one of the parties makes out a
prima facie case, the Board in interpreting this section is requir-
ing more than what the mere words of the section ask for. Still,
such a policy position by the Board is necessary if it does not
want to make determinations in the 10 (k) proceeding which will
be invalidated at a later date when the Board finds that no
8(b) (4) (D) charge could be sustained against the union. The
problem, therefore, is not so much the Board's policy, but how it
is applied. The clear approach for the Board would be to em-
phasize the word "reasonable." Under this approach the Board
22. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (1963).
23. B. P. John Furniture Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 63 (1963).
24. 141 N.L.R.B. 888 (1963).
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should only consider the reasonableness of the evidence intro-
duced by the party alleging an 8(b) (4) (D) violation.
In regard to this limitation on the scope of jurisdictional dis-
putes, it might be wise at this point to consider the interrela-
tionship between 8(b) (4) (D) and other sections of the Act. In
Eichlay Corp. v. NLRB,25 the machinists charged the employer
with discrimination under Section 8(a) (3) because he would
only hire members of the carpenters union. The employer as a
defense to this action stated that the real problem in the case
was a jurisdictional dispute which had forced him to make the
assignment to carpenters. The trial examiner in finding the
employer guilty of a breach of Section 8(a) (3) in preferring
one union over the other stated:
Generally speaking, it is true that an employer has a certain
freedom of choice in assigning work to employees but that
right is not without limitations, that is, when assigning
work the employer may not infringe upon the prohibitions
against discrimination contained in Section 8(a) (3) of the
Act and numerous decisions of the Board have rejected the
respondent's argument that Section 8(b) (4) (D) implies an
exception to the proscription of 8(a) (3) as to unlawful
hiring practice.
Upon the foregoing the undersigned rejects respondent's
argument that Section 8(b) (4) (D) by implication gives an
employer the right to assign work without regard to the
prohibitions against discrimination in Section 8(a) (3) of
the Act. The fact that Section 8(b) (4) (D) would forbid the
IAM from protesting the respondent's discriminatory hiring
practices by strike cannot in any way estop the IAM from
bringing in issue such practices by filing charges that the
respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.26
The Board affirmed the trial examiner's finding. In affirming
the Board, the court of appeals stated:
Section 8(b) (4) (D) prohibits a union from resorting to
such tactics as strikes and secondary boycotts to obtain work
assignments, but it does not purport to nullify Section 8
(a) (3) by licensing the employer to make work assignments
without first complying with the union shop requirements
25. 102 N.L.R.B. 680; 206 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1953).
26. Eichlay Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 680, 688, 206 F.2d 799, 806 (3d Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 16
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of the latter section. Nor does it disallow a union from filing
charges even if its motive is to gain jurisdiction over the
work involved for Section 8(b) (4) (D) deals with certain
prohibited means only, i.e., strikes and secondary boycotts. 27
Hence, the court of appeals limited jurisdictional disputes for
purposes of 8(b) (4) (D) to those involving strikes and picketing.
Likewise, the Board, in determining whether there is reasonable
cause to believe, will be interested only in jurisdictional disputes
that are proscribed by this section.
Under a recent Board decision2 8 the 8(a) (3)-8(b) (4) (D) sit-
uation will be eliminated. In that case a majority of the Board
agreed with the trial examiner that in a complaint against a
union under Section 8(b) (2) for striking in order to cause the
employer to assign certain disputed work to it, rather than to
another union, and it appeared that the strike was caused by a
jurisdictional dispute, all issues pertaining to such jurisdictional
dispute must be first considered under Section 8(b) (4) (D) and
10(k) before the issues are considered under 8(b) (2). This case
concerned the building of a garage for which members of the
laborers and carpenters unions were employed. The disputed work
involved the stripping and carrying work connected with the
removal of wooden and steel forms from hardened cement and
carrying the forms to the next point of erection. When the car-
penters began performing this work, the laborers claimed that
they were entitled to it and physically tried to prevent the car-
penters from carrying it out. The employer was then forced to
lay off the carpenters. The general counsel contended that the
laborers had violated 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) by engaging in a
strike and using violence to force the employer to assign the
disputed work to its members. The Board, in ordering a hearing
before the same trial examiner to determine the jurisdictional
dispute, stated:
The Board is of the opinion that the facts show that a juris-
dictional dispute exists here as the trial examiner found.
The Board is of the further opinion that if the respondent's
members were shown to be entitled to the disputed work,
respondent could then have asserted such right as a defense
to the 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (1) (A) allegation of the complaint.
Accordingly, the respondent having contended and the trial
27. Eichlay Corp., supra note 26, at 804.
28. Cement-Work Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 694 (1963).
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examiner having found that an underlying jurisdictional
dispute existed herein and the Board having duly considered
the matter, we find that it would effectuate the policies of
the Act in the instant case to permit the respondent to intro-
duce evidence as to whether or not the respondent's members
who were employed by the employer were entitled to the
disputed work. However, the Board is also of the opinion
that in these circumstances, the parties, including the Car-
penters involved, should, before the Board directs a further
hearing, be given an opportunity to show that they have
adjusted their work assignments herein or that they have
agreed upon methods for voluntary adjustment thereof.29
As 8(b) (2) is the union's counter-part of 8(a) (3), what has been
said about 8(b) (2) should also apply to 8(a) (3). As a follow-up
to this decision, the Board in Northerm Imperial,30 found that the
employer and the union violated the Act by the employer's dis-
charge of four carpenters as a result of union pressure and by
hiring in their stead pile drivers dispatched by the union. The
Board also found that no jurisdictional dispute within the mean-
ing of the Act existed since the carpenters' union had not dis-
puted the right of the pile drivers' union to fill the jobs in
question.
The Board, in holding that one section of the Act which also
involves aspects of 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) will be held in abey-
ance while the 10(k) proceeding is conducted, is contrary to its
position in the Arthur Venneri Co. case.81 In that case Venneri
was hired to construct two hangars at Andrews Air Force Base
near Washington, D. C. He subcontracted the plumbing installa-
tion to two firms, one employing members of the United Asso-
ciation of Plumbers and Pipefitters and the other, Hod Carriers.
The plumbers' union objected, claiming the right to all the
plumbing work under its contract with Akron Mechanical Con-
tractors, one of the subcontractors. When its request was denied,
it induced Akron employees to refuse to install plumbing on the
Venneri projects. The Board, holding that this action was illegal
secondary activity since Akron could not assign the work, and
hence was a neutral in the controversy, pointed out that Akron
was powerless to effect the result which the union sought. The
29. Cement-Work Corp., supra note 28, at 694.
30. 142 N.L.R.B. 768 (1963).
31. 137 N.L.R.B. 828 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
dctied, 84 Sup. Ct. (1963).
[Vol. 16
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Board said that it was difficult to conceive what effect the
union's conduct was designed to produce other than to force
Venneri to sever relations with the second subcontractor and to
reassign this work to Akron. Member Fanning dissented on the
ground that this case should be deferred since the Board had
pending proceedings under 10(k) which involved the same facts
as the case being cited. In recommending that the 10(k) pro-
ceeding be held first, he declared:
The inconsistency of the majority's position rises, I think,
from the difficulty of enforcing Section 10(k) and 8 (b)
(4) (D), unique provisions of this Act, consistent with others
and sometime conflicting provisions of the same Act. It
would hardly fulfill the Congressional purposes of settling
jurisdictional disputes through Board proceedings or volun-
tary adjustment to hold, on one hand, that a meritorious
charge under Section 8(b) (4) (D) would be sufficient to
enjoin all strikes for work assignment, but that an award
of the disputed work to the striking union would not neces-
sarily permit that union to continue its activities under this
section.... Such harmony cannot be achieved by a me-
chanical application of the terms 'primary' and 'secondary'
when applied to the provisions of Section 8(b) (4) to em-
ployers involved in jurisdictional disputes in the building
and construction industry. Clearly, where the struck em-
ployer is a stranger to the jurisdictional dispute and is un-
necessarily enmeshed in controversy over work assignment
in which it has no interest or concern, a proper accommoda-
tion between Section 10(k) and 8(b) (4) (D) and Section
8(b) (4) (B) would indicate that the latter prohibition
should be prevailed. However, where underlying jurisdic-
tional disputes realistically involve the struck employer by
reason of his performance of the type of work involved in
the dispute on the project, the provisions of 8(b) (4) (B)
must give way to those of 10(k) and 8(b)(4) (D) so that
jurisdictional dispute can be resolved in a manner consistent
with Congressional intent.
I am not prepared to hold in the instant case that the facts
fairly demonstrate the applicability of Section 8(b) (4) (D)
rather than Section 10(k). I note that it is customary in the
construction industry for a general contractor to assign the
work of craft employees by sub-contracting to other em-
ployers rather than employing craft employees himself. In
17
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these circumstances a decision that a craft unit cannot strike
its immediate employer over the assignment of work on the
same construction project necessarily means that virtually
all strikes of this nature in the construction industry are
prohibited by this Act. Yet, this was the industry in which
Congress was most concerned in enacting the special provi-
sions of Section 10(k) and 8(b) (4) (D).
32
The problem that Member Fanning envisioned came to pass
in the second Arthur Venneri Company case33 which involved
the jurisdictional dispute aspects of the first decision. The Board
majority awarded the disputed work to Local 456, International
Hod Carriers instead of Local 5, Plumbers. Member Fanning
again dissented in an eight-page opinion on the ground that,
since the conduct of Plumbers had been proscribed by Section
8(b) (4) (B), such conduct could not give rise to a justiciable
controversy within the meaning of Section 10(k). In reaching
this conclusion, Member Fanning made the following obser-
vation:
In any such determination, the Board must decide that the
striking union is or is not entitled to the work it claims. If
it is not entitled to the work, if the dispute is not voluntarily
adjusted, if there is no compliance with the Board's decision,
the provisions of Section 8(b) (4) (D) are fully applicable
and the strike over the work assignment is enjoinable as an
unfair labor practice. If, however, the striking union is
entitled to the work and the dispute is not voluntarily ad-
justed and the parties fail to comply with the Board's deci-
sion, the Board's 10(k) determination is effectuated only
by permitting the striking union to continue its strike. In
this circumstance the General Counsel does not present the
Board with a complaint alleging an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(b) (4) (D). The employer with the power
to assign the disputed work can either comply with the
Board's award or accept the consequences of the economic
pressure against him. Thus, it would seem alternative sanc-
tions result from the failure of the parties to comply with
the 10(k) determination. In the case of the striking union,
the sanction is an injunction; in the case of the noncomply-
ing, the sanction is continuation of the strike. On the surface,
the decision in the instant case suggests no diminution in
32. Arthur Venneri Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 828, 835 (1962).
33. 145 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (1964).
[Vol. 16
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these alternatives. Had the respondent been awarded the
disputed work, presumably the charge against it, alleging a
violation of Section 8(b) (4) (D) would have been dismissed.
At this point, a significant change appears. For here, if
Venneri had refused to comply with the Board's award of
the disputed work to Plumbers, he would not be required to
accept as a sanction the continuation of the respondent's
strike. That conduct has been and will remain enjoined under
Section 8(b) (4) (B). It is clear, therefore, that Venneri and
the Laborers had everything to gain and nothing to lose in
the 10(k) proceeding. As a result of the majority's award of
the work to Laborers, respondent's pressure against Venneri
will be enjoined under two sections of the Act, 8(b) (4) (D)
and 8(b) (4) (B). If the award had gone against the Labor-
ers and in favor of the Plumbers, the pressure against Ven-
neri would still be enjoined under the latter section. Ob-
viously, under the majority's procedure, no sanction is avail-
able in this proceeding to secure compliance with a 10(k)
determination in favor of the Plumbers.
The majority noted that, if the respondent was found in
the 10(k) proceeding to be entitled to the disputed work, it
could take primary action against the employer who had
this work to assign .... What primary action could the
respondent take against Venneri? Venneri.has no contract
with respondent nor does it employ its members. If the
respondent threatened or picketed Venneri, would not "an"
object be to require cessation of business between Venneri
and Nicholes? And is not this objective specifically forbid-
den under Board and court's outstanding decision under
Section 8(b) (4) (B)? It would, therefore, seem that this
proceeding is truly a one-way street. In my view, a Section
10(k) determination is meaningless unless it contemplates
two-way traffic.3 4
The majority's decision failed to take notice of the peculiar
nature of the construction industry. In this industry jurisdic-
tional disputes not only involve two sets of employees, but also
two sets of contractors, all of whom are competing for the same
work. An award of work not only affects an employee group,
it also affects the employer of the employee group. Where there
are competing employers, neither one is neutral within the mean-
34. Arthur Venneri Co., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 161 (1964).
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ing of 8(b) (4) (B). In this industry, the competing employer
should be excluded from the definition of a secondary employer.
Under such an approach, the mere presence of two employers
who will be affected if the union secures its objectives should not
alone be sufficient to establish an unlawful secondary boycott.
In a pre-CBS case, NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners,35 the court denied enforcement of what is now
8(b) (4) (B) on the ground that a strike by the carpenters to
force a subcontractor to assign certain disputed work to its mem-
bers was not to force the general contractor to cease doing busi-
ness with the subcontractor, but rather to force the subcontractor
to assign the disputed work to its members.
Because the majority in the Cennt Work case did not mention
Arthur Venneri, it is still an open question whether or not the
Board will defer the 10(k) proceeding where both 10(k) and
another section of the Act other than 8(b) (4) (B) are involved
in a case. Of course, the Board, in determining whether a reason-
able cause exists under 10(k), will be faced with how much def-
erence will be given to other sections of the Act when they are
intertwined with the 8 (b) (4) (D) problem. If the Board believes
that some other section of the Act has preference over the 8(b)
(4) (D)-10(k) sections, then perhaps the Board should hold in
abeyance the 10(k) proceedings until the other section issues
have been resolved. It might be noted that the Board in the
Ernest Fortunate case8 adopted the recommendations of a trial
examiner that the Act required that all issues pertaining to juris-
dictional disputes must first be considered under 8(b) (4) (D)
and 10(k) before they are considered violative of other sections
of the Act.
In at least one other case, the Board has held that one section
of the Act could not be a defense to an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor
practice. In Nichols Electric Co.,3 7 the union contended that
under its contract employers are prohibited from subcontracting
work to others who are not employing members of its union and
that such provisions were lawful under the proviso of Section
8(e) relating to the construction industry. Under this provision
its members were lawfully entitled to protest the breach of its
contract prohibiting subcontracting. Nevertheless, the Board dis-
agreed, holding:
35. 261 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1958).
36. 140 N.L.R.B. 694 (1963).
37. 140 N.L.R.B. 458 (1963).
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The construction industry proviso under Section 8(e) only
permits the making of voluntary agreements relating to the
contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the con-
struction site. It does not legalize picketing, strikes or other
inducement of employees or persons proscribed by Section
8(b) (4) in order to secure or enforce such agreements.38
The second limitation of the scope of the jurisdictional dispute
was laid down by the Board in Safeway Store Inc. 9 where the
Board held that Sections 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) were designed
to resolve competing claims between rival groups of employees
only. In this case, Local 107 of the Teamsters had for some 10
years represented the drivers employed at Safeway's Wilmington
meat processing plant. On the last day of 1959 Safeway dis-
charged the three Wilmington drivers who comprised the entire
bargaining unit represented by Local 107 and arranged for the
driving work previously done by these employees to be done by
the drivers at its Lanover, Maryland, and Kearney, New Jersey,
plants. Safeway drivers at the latter plants were represented
by Teamsters' Locals 639 and 660, respectively. Upon hearing of
the discharge, Local 107, on behalf of the three discharged driv-
ers, picketed the Wilmington plant with signs proclaiming that
Safeway was unfair to Local 107. At no time did Local 639 and
Local 660 press Safeway for the work involved. In the Board's
view the facts did not disclose a "jurisdictional dispute" as con-
templated in 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) since there was not present
any real competition between the unions or groups of employees
for the work. As the Board viewed the problem, the real dispute
was wholly between Local 107 and Safeway and concerned only
Local 107's attempt to retrieve the jobs of its members. Since
the strike here was a protest of Safeway's action and also a con-
certed effort to preserve Local 107's bargaining status, it did
not come within the statutory sense of a jurisdictional dispute,
i.e., a dispute between competing groups of employees claiming
the right to perform certain work tasks. In reaching this con-
clusion, the Board made the following comments:
The Supreme Court said it was the "Board's responsibility
and duty to decide which of two or more employee groups
claiming the right to perform certain work tasks is right
and then specifically to award such task in accordance with
38. Nichols Electric Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 458, 460 (1963).
39. 134 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961); see also, Butcher & Sweeney, 143 N.L.R.B.
No. 39 (1963).
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its decision." Implicit in this directive is the proposition that
Section 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) were designed to resolve
competing claims of rival employees, and not to arbitrate
disputes between a union and employer where no such com-
peting claims are involved. Certainly, it was not intended
that every time an employer elected to reallocate work among
its employees or supplant one group of employees with an-
other, a jurisdictional dispute exists within the meaning of
the cited statutory provisions.
It is apparent that the dispute here is not in its very
nature the kind that Congress devised 10(k) to resolve. In
a normal situation the Section 10(k) proceeding is designed
to determine which of two competing employee groups is
entitled to do the disputed work. In the normal situation
also the employer is willing to assign the work to either
group if the other will just let him alone. We do not mean
to suggest that this is the only kind of situation where Sec-
tion 10(k) is applicable. But the normal situation demon-
strates how far removed is the instant case where the em-
ployer by his own unilateral action created the dispute by
transferring work away from the only group claiming the
work. We venture the suggestion that nothing in the lengthy
legislative history of the jurisdictional dispute provisions
can be read as suggesting that Congress concede this as the
type of dispute to which those provisions were to be regarded
as applicable.40
Members Rodgers and Leedom disagreed with the Board's inter-
pretation. Under their view it was immaterial under Section
10(k) and 8(b) (4) (D) whether or not the union or group to
whom the work had been assigned actively asserted a right to
the work and opposed the claim of another union or group.
Under their view since Safeway had sound economic reasons for
assigning the work to Local 660 and Local 639 members and
wanted the work performed by those employees, the Board
should not make Safeway ineligible for protection under the
Act if Locals 660 and 639 were not actively competing for the
work involved.
Under the Safeway doctrine the Board is only concerned with
those work assignments where there are two or more labor or-
ganizations presently and actively seeking the assignment in-
40. Safeway Stores, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1322 (1961).
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volved. Also under such a doctrine the employer must rely on
the position of all the unions involved in order to get a determi-
nation. The effect of the Board's ruling in this case will depend
on how broad or narrow an interpretation is given to the terms,
presently and actively. Inasmuch as the purpose of these sections
was to give the employer some protection in a jurisdictional dis-
pute, it is suggested that the Board define these terms so as to
include as many jurisdictional disputes as possible. One way to
solve this problem would be for the Board to force the second
union involved to take a position as to the merits of the dispute
involved. If the second union refused to take a position, it should
be considered as having acquiesced in the IBoard's holding in the
particular case and should be bound by the Board's determina-
tion in any future cases involving the same subject mattef and
the same parties. The employer has no legitimate right to com-
plain if the second union refuses to do the work since this is a
right it has under the Act.4 1 It must be remembered that Sections
8(b) (4) and 10(k) were designed for situations involving com-
peting claims between rival employees and were not designed
to require the Board to arbitrate a dispute between a union and
an employer where no competing claims are involved.
Under the Safeway doctrine the Board would be able to elim-
inate all jurisdictional disputes involving locals of the same
unions where the union has established machinery for determin-
ing the jurisdiction of each local. The Hills Transportation42 and
Valley Sheet Metal Co7&pany43 cases are good examples of Board
deference to internal machinery of the parent union being used
to settle jurisdictional disputes. In Valley Sheet Metal the em-
ployer had his principal place of business in San Francisco and
employed 35 sheet metal journeymen, all represented by Local
104 of the Sheet Metal Workers. lie dispatchd three of his
employees to install roof gutters and drain pipes at a new ware-
house under construction in San Mateo, California. When the
three San Francisco journeymen reached the job site in San
Mateo, one of them called the business representative of Local
272, Sheet Metal Workers, and advised him that three employees
had been sent by Valley Sheet Metal to do a job in that county.
The Sheet Metal International constitution, binding on all the
affiliated locals and members, provides that when qualified mem-
41. Compare Acoustics and Specialties, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 598 (1962).
42. 136 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1962).
43. 136 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).
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bers are available in a jurisdiction of the local union in which
the work shall be performed no more than two members of the
outside local will be allowed to work in the jurisdiction of the
home local union. The next morning the business agent appeared
at the job site and asked the three employees to sign a document
in which they acknowledged the existence of the two-man rule
in the international constitution and the fact that they could be
disciplined for any infraction.
After the three men signed the document, the business agent
told them that if all three continued to work, charges would be
brought against them. One of them left the job and returned to
San Francisco. Valley Sheet Metal, in order to complete the job,
agreed under protest to hire men from Local 272 until the matter
could be straightened out. In ordering that the notice of hearing
be quashed, the Board commented on the employer's contention
that Local 272 exerted illegal pressure upon it to compel place-
ment of journeymen members of Local 104 with Local 272 mem-
bers and that the two-man rule was a per se violation of 8(b)
(4) (D) :
Rather than view the 2-man rule in this case as inherently
illegal as the charging party urges upon us, we consider it
the kind of internal union arrangement which the Act, par-
ticularly under Section 10(k), is intended to encourage. The
very arrangement of permitting two foreign journeymen to
work in the jurisdiction of a single local appears as a salu-
tary adjustment of traditional jurisdictional geographic dis-
putes. In conclusion, we find on the entire record that the
facts of the case do not present a jurisdictional dispute.44
The same result of allowing the international to adjust tradi-
tional jurisdictional work claims between locals was also achieved
in Hills Transportation. There the Board upheld a Teamsters'
rule under which drivers were not permitted to make runs start-
ing and ending entirely in the area of any foreign local. As the
underlying basis of a jurisdictional dispute is competition for
jobs during a time of work stoppage, the Board's position of
allowing work to be spread around despite the inconvenience to
the employer in such a situation is legally and economically
sound.
In Safeway the Board upheld the right of a union to picket
an employer in an attempt to retrieve the jobs which had been
44. Valley Sheet Metal Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1405 (1962).
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lost through subcontracting. A constant issue under the Safeway
doctrine has been how far 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) are involved
in disputes over subcontracting. It does not seem that the Act
should cover the situation in which the union seeks to preserve
for its workers an operation presently or formerly performed
by them. In this type of work dispute, the effort is to induce one
employer to do or keep the work, instead of having it done by
another employer. In Preerete, Ino.45 the Board refused to accept
a union's contention that all it sought by the picketing was to
achieve restoration of the work to those of its members who had
been released by the company. The evidence showed that the
dispute was not limited to a particular employee or to several,
but instead extended without limit wherever the type of work
in dispute was involved. Hence, the Board will reject any argu-
ment from a union based on restoration of job where the union
seeks more than it has lost.
Because of three cases46 the whole question of subcontracting
seems to be in confusion. In Carleton Brothers, Carleton assigned
certain plumbing work to Thomas J. Kempton, a plumbing con-
tractor, at the site of a new high school being constructed in
Orangetown. Kempton assigned the installation of the gas main
to a local public utility company, Orange and Rockland Utilities.
When the utility company employees, members of the IBEW,
arrived to install the piping, a business agent of Plumbers' Local
373, which represented Kempton's employees, insisted that all
the plumbing work on the site belonged to his union. After the
utility company's employees began the installation, Local 373's
members walked off the job and began 2 days of picketing. Carle-
ton asserted that the object of the picketing was to force him to
change work assignments from the public utility firm to Kemp-
ton. Local 373 denied Carleton's assertion contending that the
dispute concerned the propriety or impropriety of the contrac-
tual arrangements entered into by Kempton and the school dis-
trict with respect to the plumbing work. The Board, in accepting
Local 373's argument, stated:
While the record does show a disagreement between re-
spondent and Kempton regarding Kempton's alleged breach
of their collective bargaining agreement, this is a matter
outside the scope of the present proceeding. The only juris-
45. 136 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1962).
46. Carleton Bros., 137 N.L.R.B. 628 (1962); Rublin Constr. Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1444 (1962); Bulletin Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1962).
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dictional dispute, if any, which is suggested by this record
relates to the assignment of the work in question to em-
ployees of Orange and Rockland, represented by the IBEW,
rather than to the plumbers represented by the respondent.
However, this last question was not the issue framed by the
charge; it was not litigated at the hearing; and it therefore
cannot constitute the essential element of the case against
the respondent.
47
In the Bulletin case, a Board majority decided that a dispute
over the distribution of the Philadelphia Bulletin newspapers
for home delivery in Atlantic City, New Jersey, did not amount
to a jurisdictional dispute. The facts of the case were these: For
some years the Bulletin had contracted with Post News, a con-
tract newspaper distributor in Atlantic City, for distribution of
newspapers to newsboys. Post News employed a driver for this
distribution who was a member of Teamsters. Local 331 did not
have a contract with Bulletin, but the Bulletin drivers were
covered by a contract between Local 628 Teamsters and the
Philadelphia Newspaper Publishing Association. Under the Bul-
letin's arrangement for Atlantic City circulation, a Local 331
driver delivered the newspapers to Post News; then in turn the
Local 331 driver delivered them to newsboys' pickup points for
home delivery. By February 1961, the Bulletin discontinued
using Post News service for home delivery, but continued to use
it for delivery of newspapers to the retail dealers. Under the new
arrangement, Bulletin trucks delivered newspapers directly to
the newsboys' pickup points themselves. Beginning on February
26, 1961, representatives of Local 331 picketed various of the
Bulletin branch supply points. The Board48 concluded that Local
331's picketing was not forbidden by the Act since the dispute
in this case was not a traditional jurisdictional dispute. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Board made the following observation:
As a result of Bulletin's decision to cease contracting out the
Atlantic City home delivery distribution work, an employee
of Post News suffered a loss of employment. The Bulletin
alone had it within its power to bring about the restoration
of this employment by reverting to its former method of
handling the distribution of the papers for home delivery.
47. Carleton Bros., mepra note 46, at 632.
48. A majority decision was signed by McCulloch and Fanning. Member
Brown who concurred with their results did not give his reasons.
[Vol. 16
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Thus, in this case the dispute is not the traditional juris-
dictional dispute between two unions wherein each union
wishes to make certain duties assigned to its members;
rather the dispute concerns the Bulletin's termination of
services of Post News and the resultant loss of employment
by a member of Local 331. Local 331's sole objective in pick-
eting was to regain for its member the employment which
it lost as a result of the Bulletin's decision to cease contract-
ing the work.
As far as this Local 331 member is concerned, his loss had
as serious consequences to him whether it resulted from the
decision of his employer, Post News, or from the decision of
the Bulletin to terminate Post News' contract. Under the
circumstances, we can conceive no valid reason for not ac-
cording him and his representative the same right to protest
his loss from employment to the party really responsible
therefor.
4 9
Member Fanning, in a footnote, distinguished his position in this
case from that in Union Carbide Chemical Comnpany."0 There
the Board found that a jurisdictional dispute did not exist. In
this situation Local 331 was seeking to compel Bulletin to go
back to its old mode of operation and was not seeking to compel
Bulletin to hire its members as was the case in Union Carbide.
In the third case, John J. Ruhlin Construction Company,
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company contracted with Ruhlin
for construction of an addition to its research facilities in Akron.
The contract reserved the disputed work for Goodyear engineers
who were represented by the Rubber Workers. But when the
Building Trades Council learned of this, they claimed that they
should do the work and, therefore, picketed the construction site.
The Board found that it was Goodyear's assignment of certain
work to its own employees, instead of contracting out such to
employers employing members of the construction trade, which
brought on the dispute and the picketing, and that the object of
the picketing was to secure the replacement of Goodyear em-
ployees with building construction trades. However, unlike the
Bulletin Company case, the Board found that there was reason-
able cause to believe that the Building Trades Council had vio-
lated Section 8(b) (4) (D).
49. Bulletin Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1391, 1395 (1962).
50. 137 N.L.R.B. 750 (1962).
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From the above cases the only conclusion that can be drawn is
that the Board feels that a meaningful interpretation of 8(b)
(4) (D) and 10(k) requires that these sections will be applied
where pressure is being exerted to force a particular employer
to assign work to one group of workers employed or to be em-
ployed directly by him rather than to another who is actively
asserting a claim to the work, and when forced assignments are
sought through the cancellation of an existing subcontract. A
corollary to this would be that any action which would be a
defense in direct work assignment context should also be a de-
fense in a subcontracting situation. In the Bulletin Company
case, the employee of the subcontractor was upheld in his right
to protest against the loss of a job to the person responsible--the
primary contractor-without having an 8(b) (4) (D) charge
filed against him. However, this right can only be exercised by
an employee who has been deprived of a job and not one who is
seeking a job as was the situation in the John G. Ruhin Con-
struction case. The remedy given the subcontractor's employees
under the Carleton case is to require a limitation in the sub-con-
tractor's contract with the primary contractor that the disputed
work will go to them and to protest any violation of this clause
by the subcontractor.
The third limitation on the scope of the jurisdictional dispute
section is that the Board will not make a determination of the
dispute where it has sufficient assurance that no further work
interruption will occur.51 In Frank B. Badolato & Sons52 the
union contended that the Board should dismiss the case in view
of the fact that the work in dispute had been completed, thereby
rendering the issue moot. The Board disagreed and decided the
case on its merits; in so doing, it stated:
We do not agree that the case is moot, particularly where,
as here, the evidence discloses a number of similar disputes
in the recent past and there is no evidence that similar dis-
putes will not occur in the future. In such cases we also do
not agree that as a policy matter this Board should restrict
itself to a single job determination. It seems to us apparent
that a practice which may be desirable for a private and
voluntary settlement may not be equally valid where a public
body acts pursuant to a statute. We believe that the scope of
51. See Turman Constr. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1962).
52. 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962).
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the determination in 10 (k) cases should be decided on the
basis of the facts in each case.
53
In three cases 54 the Board found the facts to warrant quashing
the notice of hearing. In the Ray case the facts on which the
Board quashed the notice of hearing were: (1) a long period of
time had elapsed since the event had been completed; (2) the
absence from the state where the dispute occurred of the charging
employer; and (3) the record disclosed that the employer was
not too greatly concerned with the problem. In Montgomery
Ward the charges were filed under Section 10(k) in 1959 alleg-
ing that Local 816 violated the Act by inducing employees of
Montgomery Ward and Sidel Leasing Corporation to engage in
a strike for the purpose of forcing Sidel to assign drivers repre-
sented by Local 816, rather than employees of Sidel who were
members of Local 138 Teamsters, to deliver Montgomery Ward
merchandise. In 1962, when the case reached the Board for a
second determination, Local 816 had already disclaimed the
disputed work and Sidel was no longer employed by Montgomery
Ward to deliver its merchandise. The Board felt that with these
pertinent facts changed, no useful purpose would be served by
continuing to process the case and, accordingly, quashed the
notice of hearing. In the third case, E. A. Weinel, the notice of
hearing was quashed because the disputed work occurred outside
the normal operations of the company; hence, no useful purpose
would be served by a hearing on the merits.
In addition to the three limitations above, the Board will not
make a determination if all the parties involved agree to a settle-
ment or a voluntary method for settling the underlying dispute.
The Board, in Armco Drainage and Metal Products Company,
55
upon finding that all the parties to the dispute had agreed upon
a voluntary method of adjustment of the work-assignment dis-
pute, quashed the notice of hearing. Armco Drainage, a sub-
contractor on a highway construction project, contracted to in-
stall sectional plate pipe which was used primarily for drainage.
The work in dispute was that of installing, assembling and erect-
ing the sectional plate pipe. The Iron Workers and the Hod
Carriers both claimed this work for their members. The Board
53. Frank B. Badolato & Sons, 135 N.L.R.B. 1392, 1401 (1962).
54. Ray Fabricating and Manufacturing Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1962);
Montgomery Ward and Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 443 (1962); E. A. Weinel, 140
N.L.R.B. 1156 (1963).
55. 137 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1962) ; see also, Butcher & Sweeney Constr. Co., 143
N.L.R.B. No. 39 (1963).
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found that both the unions and Armco were bound by agreement
to submit the dispute to the National Joint Board for Settlement
of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Building and Construction
Industry. Under such circumstances, the Board deemed it appro-
priate to permit the parties to resolve the question by continued
resort to the joint board procedure. In so doing, the Board
declared:
The Board has held that it will quash the Notice of Hearing
in these proceedings once it appears that all parties have
agreed upon a voluntary method for adjusting the dispute
whether or not the chosen arbitration body has considered
and decided the issue. Indeed, it has also deemed immaterial
the fact that one of the parties may have announced in ad-
vance that it will not honor a future decision made pursuant
to the agreed upon method, or have rejected it after it was
made. To hold otherwise would condone and sanction a
party's breach of the agreement and would tend to discour-
age and render worthless the making of such agreements as
contrary to the statutory purpose to encourage the voluntary
adjustment of jurisdictional disputes.56
Under this policy, the Board has consistently held that all
parties have to agree to a voluntary settlement or a method for
such in order to relieve the Board of the obligation to decide
the jurisdictional dispute on the 10(k) determination. "All
parties" include not only the two or more unions involved but
also the employer. In Frank B. Badolato and Son5 7 the Board
held that it would not accept an adjustment or method of adjust-
ment which would bind the two or more unions but not the
employer. 58 In the New Yorl Times Company case 59 the Board
held that arbitration under an agreement which would only bind
one of the unions and the employer and would leave the other
union unaffected could not be viewed as a voluntary adjustment
under Section 10(k). In one case, News Syndicate Company,60
in a dispute between the mailers and deliverers, both unions had
separate contracts providing for arbitration between itself and
56. Armco Drainage and Metal Products Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1753, 1757
(1962).
57. 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962).
58. It is not necessary for the employer to be a party to the inter-union settle-
ment if the losing union voluntarily withdraws from seeking the work. See Port
Huron Sulphite & Paper, 140 N.L.R.B. 79 (1962). However, the Board will
not quash where the losing party fails to disclaim its interest.
59. 137 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1962).
60. 141 N.L.R.B. 578 (1963).
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the employer. At the time of the hearing the mailers took the
position that there was no jurisdictional dispute in the case since
there had been an adjustment of the dispute. The adjustment,
according to the mailers, consisted of two arbitration awards. In
the arbitration award under the mailers' contract, the arbitrator
awarded the disputed work to the mailers; but in the arbitration
under the deliverers' contract, a different arbitrator awarded
the disputed work to the deliverers. The mailers argued that
these two awards, even though inconsistent, constituted voluntary
adjustment of the disputed work under Section 10(k) of the
Act. However, the Board did not agree since neither adjustment
in this case bound both disputing unions. In such a situation,
however, if the union instituting the arbitration proceeding loses,
the Board will consider this fact in making its determination.
Consequently, if one union contractually agrees with the em-
ployer to submit a jurisdictional dispute to an arbitrator, he will
be bound if he loses, but the award will have no effect on Board
proceedings if he wins. It must be remembered in these cases
that any form of settlement, including arbitration, will be suf-
flcient.6
1
There remains one further problem before we proceed to the
question of what standards the Board uses in deciding jurisdic-
tional disputes. Essentially, the problem is whether a work stop-
page to cause compliance with a contract is a jurisdictional
dispute? In two cases, American Marline662 and Brown & vil-
liamson Tobacco Company,63 the Board indicated that contract
demands were not insulated from Section 8(b) (4) (D) and hence
could constitute violations of the Act. Prior to the Columbia
Broadcasting case, the Board had held that a strike for a work-
assignment clause covering future work assignments was not a
violation 64 but that a strike for a work-assignment clause cover-
ing a present assignment of work was a violation.65 In a recent
decision, Rocky Mountain Bank Company,66 the Board upheld
a strike by a union which was trying to force the employer to
incorporate a clause giving jurisdiction over certain work to this
union where the work was being currently done by a member
of a different union. The Board viewed this as a dispute between
the union and the employer over the terms of their collective bar-
61. See Precrete, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1962).
62. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1964).
63. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1963).
64. Anheuser-Busch, 101 N.L.R.B. 346 (1952).
65. Anning-Johnson Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1955).
66. 145 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1964).
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gaining agreement and not over the assignment of specific work.
Viewed in this light, the Board held this not to be a jurisdictional
dispute. If the Board adheres to this view, the next logical step
would be for the Board to uphold the validity of a strike to
enforce a contract clause negotiated after an adverse 10(k)
determination or a strike seeking a clause contrary to the Board's
10 (k) determination. These cases seem contrary to Congressional
intent and should be reconsidered by the Board.
STANDARDS
In J. A. Jones Construction Company,67 the first case after
the Columbia Broadcasting case making an affirmative award of
work, the Board expressed its position on standards to be used
in making a determination in the following quotation:
At this beginning stage in making jurisdictional awards as
required by the court, the Board cannot and will not formu-
late any general rules for making them. The Board will
consider all relevant factors in determining who is entitled
to the work in dispute, e.g., the skill and work involved,
certifications by the Board, company industry practice,
agreements between unions and between employers and
unions, awards of arbitrators, joint board in the AFL-CIO
in the same or related cases, assignment made by the em-
ployer in the efficient operations of the employer's business.
This list of factors is not meant to be exclusive, but is by
way of illustration. The Board cannot at this time establish
the weight to be given the various factors. Every decision
will have to be an act of judgment based on common sense
and experience rather than on precedent. It may be that later
with more experience in concrete cases a measure of weight
can be accorded the earlier cases.68
This section will deal with how much weight the Board has given
to each of the standards that it has used.
1. CERTnMCATIOX
A factor which has been considered in almost every decision
and which has been the dominant factor in at least two cases69
67. 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).
68. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1410 (1962).
69. P. Lorillard Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1382 (1962); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1719 (1962).
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is that of Board certification. Whether certification can truly be
a factor in a jurisdictional dispute determination depends on the
Board's policy in representation cases as to work assignments.
Currently the Board has two positions which are inconsistent
with each other.
The first position is expressed in the General Aniline and Film
Corporation and Plumbing Contractors Association of Baltimore
line of cases.7 0 In General Aniline the issue was whether the
Board's certification amounted to an award to the employees in
the unit found appropriate to perform exclusively all the duties
required by their job classification. The Board, in a two para-
graph opinion, stated:
As we have stated before, the Board's only function in a
representation proceeding is to ascertain and certify to the
parties the name of the bargaining representative, if any,
that has been designated by the employees in the appropriate
unit. It is not our function to direct, instruct, or limit that
representative as to the manner in which it is to exercise its
bargaining agency. 1
The Board, in refusing to resolve a question of work jurisdiction
relied on two cases, Wilson Packing and Rubber Company72 and
Bendix Aviation Corporation.73 In the Wilson Packing case the
Board held that a contract of a defunct union was not a bar to
a new union's representation of the employees. In Bendim- Avia-
tion the UAW requested an election among patent makers to see
if they wanted to join the UAW. The employer asked that the
present UAW contract should not automatically be extended to
the patent makers if the Board conducted an election. The Board
refused to do so, citing Wilson Packing. Thus, the Board's policy
of refusing to resolve a question of work assignment is initially
based on two cases having no relationship with the work juris-
dictional dispute area.
In the Plumbing Contractors Association of Baltimore case
one union asked that the General Aniline case be overruled and
that the appropriate unit should be defined in terms of work
jurisdiction so limited as not to infringe upon the jurisdiction of
other unions. The Board rejected this request and stated:
70. General Aniline and Film Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 467 (1950); Plumbing Con-
tractors Ass'n. of Baltimore, 93 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1951).
71. General Aniline and Film Corp., supra note 70, at 468.
72. 51 N.L.R.B. 910 (1943).
73. 77 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1948).
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We believe that the Intervener misapprehends the effect of
a Board certification in a representation proceeding. As the
Board has heretofore held and as here we reiterate, a Board
certification in a representation proceeding is not a juris-
dictional award; it is merely a determination that a majority
of the employees in an appropriate unit have selected a
particular labor organization as their representative for
purposes of collective bargaining. It is true that such certi-
fication presupposes a determination that the group of
employees involved constitutes an appropriate unit for col-
lective bargaining purposes and in making such a determina-
tion the Board considers the general nature of the duties
and work task of such employees. However, unlike a juris-
'dictional award, this determination by the Board does not
freeze the duties or work task of the employees in the unit
found appropriate. Thus, the Board unit finding does not
per se preclude the employer from adding to or subtracting
from the employees' work assignment. Where that finding
may be determined by it does not determine job content nor
does it signify approval in any respect of any work task
claim which the certified union may have made before this
Board or elsewhere.
74
Two interesting things about the opinion is that the Board
refused to pass on the meaning of 8(b) (4) (D) that a union
could picket an employer where he is failing to conform to a
Board order or a certification and that language in the opinion
indicates that the Board could make a determination on the merit
of the work if it wished.
In a series of cases from 1951 to 1957, the Board affirmed the
doctrine of the General Aniline and Plumbing Constructors As-
sooiation of Baltimore cases.7 5 In 1963 the Board, in the Gas
Service Company case,7V resurrected General Aniline77 in deny-
ing a motion to clarify a determination of representatives. In
denying the motion, the Board noted:
The petitioner requested the Board to find that the work
performed by the pipeline division employees within the
74. Plumbing Contractors Ass'n of Baltimore, 93 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1087.
75. St. Regis Paper, 104 N.L.R.B. 411 (1953) ; Heating, Piping and Air Con-
ditioning Contractors, 110 N.L.R.B. 261 (1954); Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, 97 N.L.R.B. 566 (1951); International Harvester, 103 N.L.R.B. 218
(1953) ; Anheuser-Busch, 116 N.L.R.B. 1988 (1956).
76. 140 N.L.R.B. 445 (1963).
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territorial limits of Kansas City divisions belong to the em-
ployees it represents. At no time during this proceeding did
the petitioner state that it seeks to represent the employees
employed in the pipeline division, nor did it specifically ask
the Board to include such employees in the certified unit.
In fact, at the hearing the petitioner expressly denied that
it sought to represent pipeline division employees. Thus, it
is now clear that the petitioner in effect is asking that the
Board assign to employees in the unit represented by the
petitioner certain of the work now being done by employees
in the pipeline division. However, work assignment disputes
are not properly matters for consideration and resolution in
a representation proceeding. As the Board has said, it is its
sole function in representation proceedings to ascertain and
certify the name of the bargaining representative if any that
has been designated by the employees in the appropriate
unit. It is not the Board's responsibility in representation
proceedings to decide whether employees in the bargaining
unit are entitled to do any particular work or whether an
employer has properly reassigned work, from employees in
the bargaining unit to other employees. Accordingly, the
petitioner's motion insofar as it requests the Board to assign
certain work to employees in the certified unit is hereby
denied.
78
The second line of Board cases begins with the KHQ and
KHQ-TV case.79 This case involved a motion to show cause why
the unit as certified should not be amended to describe more
specifically services performed by staff announcers. Here the
Board granted the motion that staff men performing certain
incidental duties of a particular nature belong in a certified unit.
Following this in the Mississippi Lime Company case,80 the
Board granted a motion to clarify a work assignment involving
what group of employees was to haul scrap and rock dump. The
Board during the course of its discussion commented:
The ground rules for assignment of work involving move-
ment of employees and materials between the various geo-
graphical areas which the parties concede are coextensive
with their bargaining unit represents a practical and reason-
78. Gas Service Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 445, 446 (1963); See also, Employing
Plasterers Ass'n., 118 N.L.R.B. 17 (1957); Denver Heating, 99 N.L.R.B. 251
(1952).
79. 111 N.L.R.B. 874 (1955).
80. 124 N.L.R.B. 884 (1958).
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able approach which has apparently operated to the satisfac-
tion of the union and employer in the past.
Certification of the Hod Carriers . . . is hereby clarified
so as to include the work of hauling stone from Peerless
Storage area to the work dump and New Hopper .... The
certification of the Glass Workers . . . is hereby certified
to include work involved in the operating and maintaining
of the conveyor system.8'
Again, in the St. Regis Paper Company case,8 2 the Board
clarified a worker's certificate to cover a work assignment. In
1953 the Board issued a separate certification of representation
to the IAM as the representative of "all maintenance department
employees, including maintenance men, maintenance helpers and
maintenance oilers," and to the IBEW as the representative of
"all powerhouse employees." On April 8, 1960, the IAM filed a
motion to clarify the 1953 certification. The parties sought to
have the Board determine which of the 1953 certifications in-
cluded certain disputed work tasks involving maintenance of
power equipment outside the powerhouse. It was stipulated at
the hearing that the issue to be resolved was whether the Board
intended "for the powerhouse maintenance men to perform the
maintenance and repair work on any equipment located outside
the powerhouse building." The Board found that the IBEW
certification for powerhouse employees properly included the dis-
puted tasks and the employees performing them. The Board then
clarified the IBEW certification by specifically including in the
description of the appropriate unit of powerhouse employees "all
powerhouse employees engaged in repair work on the recovery
boiler ... "
A full Board indicated its disapproval of the General Aniline
doctrine in the Texlite case.83 In this case the IBEW sought the
inclusion of a clause which would require Texite to assign to the
employees in the existing classification certain work tasks then
being performed by employees in the unit represented by the
steelworkers. The general counsel for the Board contended that
these duties or work tasks were assigned to the employees in the
steelworkers unit by the 1943 Regional Director's certification;
that an assignment of such duties or work tasks to employees in
the unit represented by the IBEW would constitute an infringe-
81. Mississippi Lime Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 884, 887 (1958).
82. 130 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1961).
83. 119 N.L.R.B. 1792 (1958).
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ment upon the Steelworkers' 1943 certificate; and that the
IBEW's insistence on such a clause as a condition to signing a
contract constituted an insistence upon an illegal condition and,
hence, was a refusal to bargain in violation of 8 (b) (3) of the Act.
According to the trial examiner, the real issue between the parties
was more in the nature of a jurisdictional dispute over the per-
formance of certain duties or work tasks, i.e., whether or not they
should be performed by the employees in the unit represented by
the IBEW. On the basis of the Plumbing Contractors Associa-
tion of Baltimore case and the General Aniline case, the trial
examiner rejected the general counsel's contentions and found
that the IBEW's refusal to sign the contract did not constitute
an insistence on an illegal condition. However, the Board did not
agree with this finding of the trial examiner. In so finding, the
Board stated:
The Trial Examiner found that the respondents did not in-
sist upon any legal condition as a prerequisite to entering
into a contract because they sought only to have certain work
assigned to their members and did not also seek to have the
employees then performing such work transferred from one
unit to another. In other words, he concluded that it was
not unlawful for respondents to have insisted upon the as-
signment of work to members of the unit of electricians, so
long as the respondents did not also seek to represent the
employees in the production and maintenance unit, then
performing such work. However, as the General Counsel
points out in his brief if the Trial Examiner is correct, the
respondents could lawfully have destroyed the entire produc-
tion and maintenance unit by insisting upon the reassign-
ment of all the work being done by the employees in that
unit provided they disclaimed any intention of representing
the existing employees presently doing the work.
This brings us to the question of the nature of appropriate
bargaining units. The appropriate bargaining unit is de-
scribed in terms of people in a certain job category, for
example, all production and maintenance employees or all
electricians. In actual practice, however, this means all pro-
duction and maintenance employees? work in one case and
all employees doing the work of electricians in the other. It
is the kind of work performed which is the principal deter-
minate of groupings in bargaining units. The Board, in its
unit determination, does not decide who shall do certain
37
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work. That is ordinarily for the employer to decide. But
when the employer has decided that certain work shall be
performed by a certain class of employees and the union is
certified as the representative of such employees in an appro-
priate unit, the unit is, therefore, protected under the Board
certification from encroachment from another labor organ-
ization.84
This second line of cases indicates the Board approach to the
problem of work assignments from 1957 to 1963. It should be
noted that the Gas Service decision in 1963 did not mention or
even consider either the Bt. Regis Paper or the Texlite decision,
but instead, relied on General Aniline and Plumbing Contractors
Association of Baltimore. The question, therefore, remains:
Which line of cases should be followed by the Board in the fu-
ture ?5 This author believes the St. Regis-Texlite approach is the
correct one for the reasons given in the following paragraphs.
Both the wording and legislative history of Section 8(b) (4)
(D) indicated that Congress expected the Board to use its repre-
sentation procedures to resolve work-assignment disputes. Section
8(b) (4) (D) would make it an unfair labor practice for a union
by:
Forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work
to employees in a particular labor organization or in a par-
ticular trade, craft, or class, rather than to employees in
another labor organization, or to another trade, craft, or
class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order
or certification of the Board determining the bargaining
representative for employees performing such work.
The second part of this sentence clearly indicates that the
Board, in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, should
specifically indicate which employees are performing a particu-
lar work or should perform a particular work. Unless this is so,
this proviso has no meaning. Moreover, the legislative history 6
84. Texlite Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1792, 1797 (1958).
85. In Hayer Aircraft Corp., Case No. 10-RC-1670 (1963), the Board af-
firmed its position in St. Regis Paper that a motion to clarify could be used
to determine a work-assignment dispute. This position was followed by the
Board in Kennecott Copper Corp., 20-RC-3838 (1963). While it would appear
that both these cases reflect the Board's current policy, the fact that they were
not published cast doubt on this problem. Their nonpublication has led the
Supreme Court to believe that Gen. Aniline and Plumbing Contractors Ass'n. of
Baltimore reflected the Board's position. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
375 U.S. 261 (1964).
86. 2 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT OF
1947, at 1627 (1948).
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dictates the conclusion that the certification process should be
used to determine work assignment. During the course of the
debate, Senator Ball of Minnesota remarked:
The President [in his veto message stated that this section]
would force the union to strike if they wish to have a juris-
dictional dispute settled by the NLRB. This is not so. All
the union has to do is to file a petition under the representa-
tion section.
The Supreme Court and two other courts have indicated their
approval of the Bt. Regis-Texlite approach to the problem of
work assignments. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Radio and
Television Broadcast Engineers Union87 cited with approval an
old Board rule which provided that in a 10(k) proceeding the
Board was "to certify the labor organization or particular trade,
craft, or class or employees as the case may be which shall per-
form the particular work task in issue." The action in Local Lodge
No. 1836, 1AM v. Local No. 1505, IBETV (Raytheon Company)8 8
arose out of a suit by IAM to compel arbitration under the terms
of its collective bargaining contract. In 1946 IBEW was certified
by the Board as the bargaining representative of all production
and maintenance employees at the employer's plant. In 1952 the
IAM was certified for the machinists, thus infringing on the
IBEW unit. In 1958 there was a dispute between IAM and
IBEW as to who should perform certain work. IAM demanded
that the work being performed by the IBEW at that time be
given to it.
The grievance was processed through the lowest step of the
grievance procedure. The IAM based its claim for the work on
the job description in the contract. However, there was no agree-
ment reached in these preliminary steps and, finally, the IAM
requested arbitration. The employer denied this request on two
grounds: (1) that the matter was within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Board, and (2) that since the grievance involved a
work claim between two unions, no arbitration could be had with-
out the IBEW being present.
The TAM then filed this action in the District Court of Massa-
chusetts. At the same time the employer filed a motion to clarify
the IAM certification. This motion was denied by the Board.
The district court allowed the IBEW to intervene in that pro-
87. 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
88. 201 F. Supp. 334 (1962), reversed, 304 F2d 365 (1st Cir. 1962), cert.
granted, 371 U.S. 908 (1962), judgment vacated, 372 U.S. 523 (1963).
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ceeding, and in its decision it ordered the employer to proceed
to arbitration but refused to order the IBEW's participation in
that proceeding.
The court of appeals reversed without passing on the IBEW's
request to participate in the arbitration proceedings.8 9 In its
decision, the court stated:
We believe that exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the con-
flict between the parties is in the Labor Board whose certifi-
cations have permitted these overlapping claims. It is true
that no unfair labor practices may have been committed but
we cannot agree with IAM's contention that the issue does
not involve a matter of representation. Its basic demand was
predicated upon the company's alleged violation of the
recognition clause. IAM protests that it is not seeking to
represent other employees. It merely wishes their work. We
are not impressed by this distinction. Certification and rep-
resentation are both bottomed on work categories. On facts
here alleged, a decision by the arbitrator in the IAM's favor,
if erroneous, would invade IBEW's certification. Arbitra-
tion by IAM's own admission is but a matter of contract.
A union contract with an employer cannot define the scope
of its certification; that is the Board's function. Not only
has the Board in the past made necessary clarification,
St. Regis Paper Oompany, 1961, 130 NLRB 1235, but juris-
dictional disputes between unions are precisely its province.
NLRB v. Radio and Television and Broadcasting Engineers
Union, 1961, 361 U. S. 573. It is appropriate that this juris-
diction be exclusive.
90
Without discussing the court's theory on pre-emption,91 in effect
the Court of Appeals was saying that the issue here is essentially
89. The Company's position that the complaint ought to be dismissed because
the IBEW would not be bound by any arbitration to be held, thus making the
whole proceeding meaningless, seems correct in that a court should not order a
meaningless act. Since what is being asked is equitable relief, the court is bound
by the equitable maxim that equity will not require the performance of a
futile act. What the court would have done is to order arbitration conditioned
on the participation of all the parties. In fact, in view of the Lincoln Mill doc-
trine, this was the only possible remedy that could have been given under
federal common law. The Board's approach to arbitration has been to refuse
to accept an award unless all the parties have been bound. But see, International
Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962); and Raley's Super Market, Case
No. 20-RC-5262 (1963).
90. Local No. 1836 v. Local No. 1505, supra note 89, at 339.
91. However, the court's theory on preemption in this area seems erroneous.
Preemption cannot apply in a 301 case. Indeed, the court recognized this on
IAM's petition for rehearing. What is really bothering the court is the fact
[Vol. 16
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one of interpretation of a Board certification; that the Board is
the best judge of what a certification says; and that the proper
proceeding in this case should have been a motion to clarify the
certification before the Board. The court, by citing the St. Regis
case, indicated that not only does the Board have the power to
do this, but that it should do this.
The conclusions reached by the First Circuit Court in the
Raytheon case was also reached by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Carey v. Westinghouse.92 In this case the union sought
arbitration of a grievance protesting the assignment of certain
work at the company's Baltimore plant to employees outside the
unit. Westinghouse claimed the work was not in the IUE unit.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the question was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB and not arbitrable.
The court stated:
Finally, the grievance at the Baltimore plant involving the
definition of the bargaining units seems to us under Federal
law to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB
which has the expertise to make clear the precise nature of
the bargaining unit certified by it.93
This action ultimately resulted in a U. S. Supreme Court
decision94 which held that arbitration was appropriate and the
matter was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board.
The court there concluded:
However the dispute be considered-whether one involving
work assignment or one concerning representation-we see
no barrier to use of the arbitration procedure. If it is a work
assignment dispute, arbitration conveniently fills a gap and
avoids the necessity of a strike to bring the matter to the
Board. If it is a representation matter, resort to arbitration
that a decision by an arbitrator would conflict with the Board's clarification of
a jurisdictional dispute assignment. However, the Board at present will accept
arbitration in a 10 (K) context and if it changes its position on the use of the
motion to clarify will probably accept arbitration in a representation proceeding.
If the Board applies the Spielberg requirements in this area, the chance of a
conflict will be minimal, and the Supreme Court "can face those questions
when they arise." See Smith v. Evening News, 51 LRRM 2646. In view of the
length of time it takes for the Board to handle these cases compared to the time
used in arbitration, it would be wise for the Board to accommodate the arbi-
trator on the basis that late-justice is an injustice.
92. 230 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1963), cert. granted, 372 U.S. 957 (1963), 52 LRRM
2748.
93. Carey v. Westinghouse, supra note 92, at 705.
94. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. West-
inghouse Electric. Co-op, 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
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may have a pervasive, curative effect even though one union
is not a party.
By allowing the dispute to go to arbitration, its fragmen-
tation is avoided to a substantial extent; and those concilia-
tory measures which Congress deemed vital to 'industrial
peace' (Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 455)
and which may be dispositive of the entire dispute are en-
couraged. The superior authority of the Board may be in-
voked at any time. Meanwhile, the therapy of arbitration is
brought to bear in a complicated and troubled area. [375
U. S. 261, 272; 55 LRRM 2042, 2047] [Emphasis added.] 95
The court, however, did not express a position on the motion to
clarify the issue.
With respect to the need for participation by both unions, the
Supreme Court, in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
supra, at 265-266, said:
* * * To be sure, only one of the two unions involved in the
controversy has moved the state court to compel arbitration.
So unless the other union intervenes, an adjudication of the
arbiter might not put an end to the dispute. Yet, the arbitra-
tion may as a practical matter end the controversy or put
into movement forces that will resolve it. The case in its
present posture is analogous to Whitehouse v. Illinois Oen-
tral Railroad Company, 349 U. S. 366, 36 LRRM 2203, where
a railroad and two unions were disputing a jurisdictional
matter, when the National Railroad Adjustment Board
served notice on the railroad and one union of its assump-
tion of jurisdiction. The railroad, not being able to have
notice served on the other union, sued in the courts for relief.
We adopted a hands-off policy, saying "Railroad's resort to
the courts has preceded any award, and one may be rendered
which could occasion no possible injury to it." [Id., at 373]
Consequently we have a U. S. Supreme Court, a federal court of
appeals, and the highest court of a state, all indicating the obli-
gation on the part of the Board to use representation procedures
to resolve work assignment disputes. Yet until the Board resolves
the problem of work assignments, certification as a factor in
maling a 10(k) determination will be negligible.
95. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. West-
inghouse, supra note 94, at 264.
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Recent cases of the Board indicate that there is a greater ap-
preciation of the interrelationship between work-assignment dis-
putes and representation procedures under the present Board.
In Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Company96 the Board went so far
as to suggest that the problem of inclusion of a classification
within a unit could best be resolved by the filing of a representa-
tion petition. If a certification is written in terms of work tasks,
both the employer and the union would be protected from future
strikes both under 8(b)(4)(D) and 8(b)(4)(C). While such
certifications are rare, they do happen. In Detroit Gravure Cor-
poration97 the mailers were certified for "all employees perform-
ing work appertaining to mailing, such as addressing, tagging,
stamping, labeling, or wrapping." It should be noted that in two
cases98 certification was a factor even though it was not specifi-
cally in terms of a work assignment.
2. Tim E om='s AsSIGNMNT
Of all the factors listed by the Board, the employer's assign-
ment seems to be the most determinative. Since the Columbia
Broadcasting case decision, there have been approximately 70
jurisdictional dispute cases by the Board. In only 5 of these"9
did the determination by the Board go contrary to the employer's
assignment, The position of the present Board can best be
summed up by a statement made by member Rodgers in his con-
curring opinion in the Philadelphia Inquirer case :100
Where, as here, there appears to be some validity to the
claims advanced by all contending parties, I would accord
substantial, if not decisive, weight to the employer's assign-
ment of the disputed work and would upset such assignment
only in the face of circumstances which virtually compel a
contrary result.10'
In the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company decision'0 2 the Board
disregarded all other factors in the case as well as an apparent
96. 142 N.L.R.B. 374 (1963).
97. 146 N.L.RB. No. 23 (1964).
98. Morrison Knudson Co., 145 N.L.R-B. No. 89 (1964) and Structural Con-
crete Corp., 1-CD-80 (1964). See also, American Mailine, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 138
(1963); Bond Elec. Co., 146 N.L.RB. No. 50 (1964).
99. Acoustics and Specialties, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1963); Iowa Power
and Light Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (1963); American Mailine, 144 N.L.R.B.
No. 138 (1963); Albin Stevadore Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (1963); General
Elec. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1963).
100. 142 N.L.R.B. 36 (1963).
101. Philadelphia Inquirer, supra note 100, at 44.
102. 137 N.L.R.B. 968 (1962). See also, Arthur Venneri, 145 N.L.R.B. No.
157 (1964).
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acquiescence in the decision of the National Joint Board and
resolved the dispute by accepting the employer's assignment. By
relying so heavily on the employer's assignment the Board
seemed to be acting contrary to the spirit of the Columbia Broad-
casting case decision since it is the employer, and not the Board,
who is deciding the jurisdictional dispute.10 3 All that the em-
ployer's assignment should indicate is that he believes the mem-
bers who were assigned the work were capable of satisfactorily
performing it.1'"
3. PAST PRACTICE
The Board, in a series of decisions, 05 has made the employer's
past practice one of its most important factors in making a 10(k)
determination. To constitute "past practice," the content of the
work cannot vary. 0 6 However, this merely seems to be an exten-
sion of its views toward the employer's assignment, but, unlike
the employer's assignment, reliance on this factor is an honest
consideration since the union which refused to object to the em-
ployer's assignment initially may be said to have acquiesced in
the employer's assignment.' 07 In one case, P. Lorillard Com-
pany, 08 the employer's past practice actually ran counter to its
current assignment. The Board, in upholding the current assign-
ment, stated:
It is clear that the Company's practice of assigning ma-
chinists to certain fixing work upon which the machinists
rely, was not only inconsistent with the Decision and Direc-
tion of Election, but was an exception to the position of both
the Company and the tobacco workers at that time that all
fixing work should be done by the fixers in the production
unit. It was sanctioned in the first place by the Company and
tobacco workers, solely in order to save the jobs of one or
more of the three machinists here involved. We do not be-
lieve that a practice which has such an origin and which
103. See the dissent of Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown in the Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 968 (1962).
104. 0. R. Karst, 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962).
105. All-Boro Air Conditioning Corp., 136 N.L.RB. 1641 (1962); Nichols
Elec. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1962); Ruhlin Constr. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1444
(1962); O'Brien Suburban Press, 137 N.L.R.B. 1758 (1962); The New York
Times, 137 N.L.R.B. 1435; Matison Navigation Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 449 (1963);
Consolidated Engineering Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 119 (1963); Kaiser Nelson Steel
and Salvage Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1963).
106. Kentucky Skilled Craft Guild, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1963).
107. See Schiavone Terminals, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 993 (1963).
108. 135 N.L.R.B. 1382 (1962).
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constitutes an exception to the Company's general plan for
handling fixing work should be given any controlling
weight.
109
This decision has two possible interpretations: (1) that a
present assignment will overrule past practice, or (2) that a
limited acquiescence by a union to past practice under peculiar
circumstances shall not amount to acquiescence where those cir-
cumstances are not present. If the Board relied on the first, then
it is wrong; if it relied on the second, this is a valid consideration
and the Board should be upheld. To date, the Board has not said
how long or under what circumstances a particular practice must
exist in order that it might bar the outside union in a 10(k)
determination. 1 0 In order for past conduct to constitute past
practice it must be unequivocal,"' it must have existed over a
reasonably long period of time, and it must have been mutually
accepted by the parties involved. Accordingly, there must be a
clear consistent pattern of behavior with sufficient quantity and
duration. The frequency of the conduct will depend on the nature
of the job involved.1 12 Of course, if a clear pattern exists, the
Board should disregard isolated instances which were contrary to
to the pattern unless they themselves indicate an incipient course
of action. For past practice to act as a bar it must be known and
accepted as such by the parties involved. Such knowledge need
not be explicit, but can be implied from the conduct of the
parties.
Thus, the Board's position is that a union must immediately
protest any invasion of its jurisdiction if it does not want to be
later held to have acquiesced to this invasion. There are some
dangers to this position. A dissenting member in the Bnowwhite!
Baking Company case"1 3 summed up these dangers:
Indeed, the Board's decision in this case may be a caveat to
any skilled craftsman to refuse assistance from a helper on
the job in order to avoid a later ruling by the Board that,
by failing to object at the proper moment, he surrendered a
part of his traditional work claim. He would have to do this
109. P. Lorillard Co., supra note 108, at 1390.
110. Schiavone Terminals, Inc., supra note 107; Snow White Baking Co.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1473 (1962); Capitol Electrotype, 137 N.L.R.B. 1467 (1962);
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1962).
111. Kentucky Skilled Craft Guild, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1963).
112. Automatic Sealing Service, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (1964). Here, the
practice was in existence for fifteen years before the union protested.
113. 137 N.L.R.B. 1473 (1962).
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even if, in the process, he hampered the more efficient com-
pletion of an employer's project for which his employer is
willing to pay. The effort of imposing such burden hardly
serves the long term interests of the interested unions or
employer." 4
While there is obvious merit to what the dissent argues, it would
be wrong for the Board to abandon this factor. What is necessary
is that the Board remember that temporary cooperation between
rival groups of employees should not be held to constitute a
waiver.
4. SUBSTMUT Worm
In the recent Philadelphia Inquirer case' 15 the Board assigned
automated work to the group that was performing it when it
was manually operated. This was a logical step after its decision
in the News Syndicate cases."" There the Board indicated ap-
proval of union contracts which provided for work assignment
along traditional lines of jurisdiction whenever machinery re-
placed manual operations. The underlying reason for this posi-
tion can be seen from the Philadelphia Inquirer case, where the
Board held:
As far as the Guild and the Photo-engravers are concerned,
while their members have done darkroom work before; they
have never done darkroom work in connection with compos-
ing the newspaper. If such were assigned to the members of
the typographers, members of the Guild and the Photo-en-
gravers would not lose one hour of work they had previously
done. On the other hand, as we pointed out, since members
of the typographers have always done composition work,
many of them might be affected to the point of losing their
employment if they are not awarded the disputed dark room
work . . . we are asked by the Guild and Photo-engravers
to overturn that assignment, thereby taking away the em-
ployment of employees who are members of the photograph-
ers and opening a new field to employees who are members
of the Guild or members of the Photo-engravers. This we
decline to do.
117
114. Snow White Baking Co., .npra note 113, at 1483.
115. 142 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1963).
116. 141 N.L.R.B. 578 and 573 (1963).
117. Philadelphia Inquirer, supra note 100, at 43. ,
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Therefore, the Board, by adopting a substitution of function test,
has taken a position favoring old employees whose jobs are made
obsolete by automation by assigning them the new work resulting
from the automation changeover. In a substitution of work award
the award must be based on the assumption that the union to
which the work was awarded will retrain its workers in the new
process. Even where there is not an exact substitution of work
the Board will award the work to the group whose previous
work is more closely related to the new process.
118
In another aspect of the Philadelphia Inquirer case, the Board
considered the fact that a contrary assignment would result in
a loss of jobs for one group which had previously performed the
old line operations. This job loss approach of the Board may
serve to reduce union opposition to the introduction of new tech-
niques and processes by the employer. This also will prevent
unnecessary unemployment. 119
5. EFFICIENCY
The Board will consider the economical aspects of a work
assignment where the assignment would affect the employer's
method of operation with the resultant effect on efficiency and
cost.120 If the work can be done by the employees now on the
job, the Board will be hesitant to make an assignment which
will require the employer to hire additional employees.121 This
allows for a better utilization of the employees on the job. Thus,
where the work task is done only intermittently, 122 or during
slack periods, 123 it is easier for the employer to use the men cur-
rently on the job. However, if the total work could not be done
by these employees and additional employees would be needed,
the Board will place little reliance on this factor.
124
While no one doubts that both efficiency and overall cost of
operations are legitimate factors to be considered in a 10(k)
determination, the issue remains as to what weight should be
118. Bejae Printing Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1963).
119. Denver Publishing Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (1963).
120. The New York Times, 137 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1962); O'Brien Suburban
Press, 137 N.L.R.B. 1758 (1962); 0. R. Karst, 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962);
Matson Terminals, 140 N.L.R.B. 449 (1963); Western Elec. Co., 141 N.L.R.B.
888 (1963). See also, McDonnald Aircraft Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1964).
121. Zuich Constr. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1963); Service Elec. Corp.,
146 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1964).
122 Wesley E. Miller. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1963).
123. Guardian Building Co., 7-CD-90 (1964).
124. Arthur Venneri Co., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (1964).
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given wage cost in a determination. This factor was considered
by way of dicta in Preorete, Inc.125 where the Board commented:
The employer also points to the fact that the laborers'
hourly rates are lower than those for the lathers and con-
tended the Board should decide the dispute in favor of the
present assignment for this reason alone. We do not agree
with so broad a statement, but we do believe that the ele-
ment of cost may be one of many relevant factors to be con-
sidered in the total evaluation of a record of this type in
reaching an appropriate conclusion as to the merits of the
dispute.1
26
In at least two cases, Bond Electric27 and Edgar H. Hughes
Company, 28 the Board explicitly took wage rates into account
in making an assignment to the lower paid group. The compara-
tive wage rate factor also appears to be lurking in the shadows
of other Board cases. Dangerous ground is reached when the rela-
tive rates of pay are considered by the Board in making a work-
assignment award. Naturally, the employer prefers the employees
with the lower pay scales. This factor will encourage unions with
lower wage scales to extend their jurisdictional claims. Unions
with higher wage scales will be forced to undersell themselves
and their members in order to compete for these jobs. The use
of work-assignment awards as a level to force down wages is
contrary to our national labor policy and should. be stopped.
6. S KILS' 29
One factor which the Board has considered in making an
assignment is the degree of skill necessary to perform the
work. 30 However, where the skills are relatively simple,131 easy
to learn, 32 or where both groups possess equally the necessary
skills to do the work, 3 3 the Board has held this not to be a
factor. But should the work be assigned to the group with lesser
125. 136 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1962).
126. Precrete, Inc., supra note 125, at 1078.
127. 146 N.L.RLB. No. 50 (1964).
128. Hughes Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (1963).
129. For a sample of cases where this was a relative factor, see Manhattan
Constr. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 975 (1962); 0. R. Karst, 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962);
Matson Terminals, 140 N.L.R.B. 449 (1963); Bishopric Products Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 1304 (1963); Western Elec. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 888 (1963); Federal
Elec. Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1963).
130. Zuich Constr. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1963).
131. Detroit Esravure Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1964).
132. Bond Elec. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (1964).
133. Service Elec. Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1964)
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skills, as in Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania134 where the Board
held that where a craft is involved, it must show the necessity
for the utilization of its specific skills. In Arthur Venneri Com-
pany -3 and McDonnald Aircraft Corporation,"', the Board
further held that where the superior skills and abilities of a craft
union are not needed it will award the work to the union with
the lesser skills. While there is a logical appeal to this approach,
the appeal is deceptive in that most skilled work involves opera-
tions that can be performed easily. By cutting away these tasks,
the Board destroys the work opportunities of the skilled craft.
7. CoMNuNrrY OF INTEREST
On an operation which is not substituted, work introduced into
a plant or on a work site, the Board believes that it is appro-
priate that the work should be performed by employees having
the same general terms and conditions of employment and their
work schedules can readily be adjusted so as to integrate the
operation into the pattern of work already in existence. 13 7 In
considering whether there is a true community of interest, the
Board will consider the duties, work areas, and supervisors. 188
8. A.REA AND INDUSTRY PRACTICE
Usually in the absence of other factors, the Board frequently
looks into area practice' 39 and then to the practice in the in-
dustry °40 in order to make a determination. Where there is no
area or industry practice with respect to the particular operation
in dispute, the Board will look at area and industry practice in
similar operations.' 4 ' But the Board will not look at outside
practice where there is an entirely different industry involved 14 2
or where the related work is not sufficiently similar. 43 Area
practice, to be significant, must be in that same industry.144 In
this area the work performed must be done almost exclusively
134. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1963).
135. 145 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (1964).
136. 146 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1964).
137. See P. Lorillard Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1382 (1962).
138. Kentucky Skilled Craft Guild, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1963); Cleveland
Pneumatic Tool Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 374 (1963).
139. All-Boro Air Conditioning Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1641 (1962).
140. O'Brien Suburban Press, 137 N.L.R.B. 1758 (1962); Schwerman Co.,
139 N.L.R.B. 1426 (1962).
141. Bejae Printing Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1963).
142. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1962).
143. See Bishopric, 140 N.L.R.B. 1304 (1963).
144. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1963).
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by one particular group.14 Thus, the party relying on this must
present the Board with a complete and adequate survey'40 show-
ing that it is the dominant group performing this work task in
this area. Where this is shown, the Board will consider this an
important factor, even outweighing industry practice.
147
9. EXPERT OPIION
The only case where this has been a factor was 0. R. Karst
where on the architectural specifications for the project, the
architect included the work in dispute within the general section
of lathing, and not in that of carpentry, thereby, in the Board's
view, indicating that at least in the architect's opinion the work
in dispute was customarily done by the lathing contractor and
his employees, and not the carpenters.
10. CONTACT
The Board earlier held that collective bargaining argreements
in effect where work was in dispute were a pertinent factor to be
considered in making affirmative awards in a 10(k) proceeding.
The Board took this position to the extreme in the NationaZ
iSugar Refining case,'1 4 where the Board weighed the various
contracts even though the contracts in question were equivocal
and vague. However, the Board backtracked from its position in
the New York Times Company case,'14 9 where the Board refused
to consider the union contracts involved because they were am-
biguous in their pertinent clauses. In the Bishopric Products
Company case,'" 0 they revised their position on collective bar-
gaining contracts so that a contract could be asserted as a defense
only where it was clear and unambiguous. This position lasted
only for a few months and the Board, in the BeJae Printing
Company case,151 went back to its original rule of weighing con-
tracts for whatever their worth even though the clauses might be
imprecise and vague. Probably the Board's best position in rela-
tionship to collective bargaining contracts was taken in the 0. R.
Karst case' 52 where the Board refused to consider the collective
145. Arthur Venneri Co., 145 N.L.t.B. No. 157 (1964).
146. Guardian Building Co., 7-CD-90 (1964).
147. Automatic Sealing Serv., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (1964).
148. 137 N.L.R.B. 1458 (1962).
149. 137 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1962).
150. 140 N.L.R.B. 1304 (1963).
151. 140 N.L.R.B. 1156 (1963).
152. 130 N.L.R.B. 282 (1962).
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bargaining agreements because "these are self serving statements
of jurisdiction by respective unions and cannot be said to be any-
thing more than a claim to the work."
Despite this statement in the 0. R. Karst case, the Board has
considered the union's contract with the employer a factor in
several cases.153 This factor seems to shift from case to case. In
at least one case, Wesley E. Miller,'54 the Board refused to find
a contractual clause controlling which was unlawful under Sec-
tion 8(e) of the Act. In so finding, the Board stated:
Quite clearly, it would both produce a contradictory result
and do violence to the Congressional intent were we to find
in a 10(k) proceeding that contractual restriction on sub-
contracting, which may not in its own right be lawfully
enforced by means proscribed by Section 8(b) (4), is never-
theless to be given decisive weight in resolving a work-as-
signment dispute. For, in effect, this would permit the
resultant award to be then relied upon to excuse the very
secondary pressures Congress meant to condemn and, there-
by, provide a means for circumventing the statutory scheme.
For the reasons stated, we reject the Operating Engineers'
contention as to the binding effect of the 1962 AGC-Operat-
ing Engineers' contract on the issue now before us. 55
This decision will have the effect of eliminating most contracts
in the construction industry. Now all the Board has to do is re-
turn to its position in 0. R. Karst and eliminate contracts in
other areas and it will be in a position to render better awards.
11. DEcisioNs o THE JoINT BoAP
In its first case after CBS, the Board, in J. A. Jones Construo-
tion Company,156 took the position that past decisions of the
National Joint Board were relevant considerations in making
a determination under 10(k). However, in the cases that fol-
lowed, the Board, for one reason or another, rejected the Joint
Board awards.157 Finally, in the 0. R. Karst case,'"8 the Board
refused to accept decisions of the Joint Board as relevant con-
siderations and stated:
153. For example, see Stuyvesant Press, 143 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1963).
154. Wesley E. Miller, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1963).
155. Wesley E. Miller, supra note 154.
156. 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).
157. For example, see Precrete, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1962).
158. 139 N.L1RB. 591 (1962).
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We do not believe that such decisions indicate more than
that the instant dispute between the unions is one of long
standing and that neither union has conceded to the other
the right to perform the work in dispute.159
Thus, decisions of the Joint Board are no longer relevant factors
in a Board determination under 10(k).
12. INTER-UNIoN AGrME]r.NTS
While these pacts have been held by the Board not to be too
meaningful, 160 in Acoustics and Specialties, Inc.161 the Board
found that it is appropriate to give effect to an inter-union pact
where most of the criteria are absent or inconclusive even though
neither the local nor the employer were parties to the agreement.
Member Rogers, dissenting, agreed with the majority that en-
couraging the parties to settle their disputes by agreement is a
salutary policy, but he did not believe it was a proper function of
the Board to enforce such agreements when it appears that one
of the parties to the agreement is flaunting it. However, the
Board has rejected such pacts where there is no meaningful
assignment of the work by the unions themselves.
162
13. LEGAL REsnucTioNs
In Consolidated Engineewing Company'63 the dispute was be-
tween plant employees classified as pipefitters and electricians
within the maintenance department and electricians within the
maintenance department and represented by the UAW, and out-
side pipefitters and plumbers represented by the UA, Plumbers.
The Board, in affirming the employer's assignment to the UAW
employees, stated that the dispute was basically between two
similarly qualified groups of electricians and plumbers. The
Board refused to discuss the UA, Plumbers' contention that
under both city and state statutes, the UAW employees were not
qualified, since under applicable state and local laws such a find-
ing would not be justified. This does not mean that the Board
will not observe state and local regulations in awarding work,
but merely that it will not apply these laws in the absence of a
159. 0. R. Karst, supra note 158, at 596. See also, Carlton Bros. Co., 141
N.L.R.B. 1138 (1963).
160. American-Saint Gobain Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1964).
161. 142 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1963).
162. Engineers Building Specialties, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1963).
163. 141 N.L.R.B. 119 (1963).
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prior ruling of the state and local agencies entrusted with their
enforcement.
14. SAFr
The Board has relied on this factor in two decisions, Hatt J.
ZuicIh Construction Company164 and Guardian Building Com-
pany.1 5 Since this factor is self-explanatory, it will not be dis-
cussed here.
THE EXTENT OF A 10(K) DETERMINATION
To date the Board has limited the extent of the applicability
of a 10(k) determination as much as possible. Almost all the
decisions have been restricted to the particular work in dispute
on the particular job involved. The Board has deviated from
this policy in only four cases. In Frank B. Badolato'166 the Board
held that the 10(k) determination should apply to Badolato's
plastering contracting operations within a three-state area in
which he normally operated. In the Western Electric Company
case167 the Board, in rejecting the CWA's contention that it
must make a determination broad enough to include all the
officers of the employer, stated:
To make such a determination we would be required to
examine and consider customs and practices for such instal-
lations in all geographical areas served by Telco, as well as
the jurisdictional claims of any other labor organization
whose members are employed by the electrical and/or build-
ing contractors in these areas. In this proceeding we do not
have other labor organizations before us nor do we have
evidence as to the custom and practices in these geographical
areas. Our determination does, however, cover assignment of
the work in issue here in any area served by Telco where
the geographical jurisdiction of CWA and Local 3 (the
opposing union) coincide.' 16 8
The Board has also gone beyond a particular job where the par-
ticular project would take 2 years to complete' 69 and wherever
164. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1963).
165. 7-CD-90 (1964).
166. 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962).
167. 141 N.L.R.B. 888 (1963).
168. Western Electric Co., supra note 167, at 897.
169. Zuich Constr. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1963).
53
Hickey: Government Regulation of Inter-Union Work-Assignment Disputes
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SoU= CAROLINA LAW REViEW
the jurisdiction of the two unions coincided. 170 Of course, where
the assignment is based on a certification it must, of necessity,
extend beyond the particular job involved.
Consequently, the Board will restrict its determination to the
particular job before it unless there is sufficient evidence in the
record to warrant its extension, and in no case will the Board
make an extension where the rights of other parties not before it
are involved. Therefore, the furthest the Board will extend the
10(k) determination will be to cover those cases where (1) the
factual situation is the same and (2) all the parties are the same.
If these two conditions are met, it will be foolish for the Board
to rehear the same facts and make the same determination since
by that time the job will be completed and a determination use-
less. But, under the present Board policy, the Frank P. BadoZato
decision is the exception and not the rule. Even if the Board con-
tinues its restricted assignments, the assignments should be so
written as to provide a guide for similar jobs and similar em-
ployers.
It might be asked why, in the situation where there is only
one employee involved, the work is not awarded to the present
employee as such. In Engineer Building Specialties171 the Board
refused to make such an assignment. Thus, despite the Board's
disclaimers, the work is not awarded to employees as such, but
is in fact awarded to a union. However, this is no problem. In
Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Company 72 the Board awarded the
work to one union at a time when the work was being done by a
person of a different union on the basis that the union awarded
the work would receive the person currently doing the work into
its membership. In a subcontracting situation, the Board has
also made a novel assignment. In that case, Bell Telephone of
Pennsylvania,'1 7 if the primary contractor did the task he had
to use his own employees, but if he subcontracted, the subcon-
tractor could use the subcontractor's own employees.
CONCLUSIONS
In the J. J. Jones Construction case the Board stated that each
case would be decided on its own facts and the weight accorded
the relevant factor would vary from case to case. The problem
170. Bond Elec. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (1964)
171. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (1963).
172. 142 N.L.R.B. 374 (1963).
173. 144 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1963).
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confronting the parties is not so much the selection of certain
factors on which to award the work but the application of these
factors in each case. In one case, a factor is relied upon, while in
the next it is rejected. Certain factors are given too much weight,
while others are ignored. These practices lead an observer to
question the factors furnished as a basis for the award or the
apology for the award. The parties are entitled to know the
relative strength accorded each factor and a sufficient time has
elapsed in order for the Board to presently evaluate each factor.
However, in certain areas the factors applied by the Board have
been very good. For example, where the problems presented to
the Board are based on technological changes, the Board has been
satisfactory in awarding the work in such a manner as to prevent
unnecessary unemployment. Of course, in this area, solutions to
these problems are beyond the limits of the Board's jurisdiction.
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